William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

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coasts and colonies of France; and his two letters to Pitt, dated

Goodwood, 3rd and 5th April, show that Pitt inclined to that opinion.

The question was important in view of a forthcoming conference of the

allied commanders and envoys at Antwerp. The letters are too long for

quotation. In that of 3rd April the duke declares that Ministers must

soon decide whether to persevere in Flanders or in maritime expeditions.

"To attempt both is to do neither well." For himself, he would much

prefer to attack Cherbourg, Brest, l'Orient, Rochefort, Nantes and

Bordeaux; but he fears that the ardour of the Duke of York will lead him

into an extensive campaign in Flanders.

 

In the second and longer letter, Richmond warns Pitt that, if he prefers

to attack the ports and colonies of France (especially the West Indies),

he ought at once to warn the envoys of the Allies at Antwerp (who were

about to discuss the plan of campaign), that we could not long afford

succour to them, and trusted that after six weeks they could do without

it, or, at least, would need it only to a very slight extent. If, he

continues, Coburg and the Prussians demur to this, we must reply that

England was at first no party to the war, and entered into it only for

the defence of the Dutch; that participation in a continental campaign

is so unpopular and ruinous, that we may be compelled to desist from it;

that by means of naval expeditions we can help the common cause steadily

and effectively; and that we are in no position to act on the Continent

because "our army, cavalry and infantry, consists almost wholly of

recruits, no part of which (men or horses) have been raised two months,

and the greater part of which are at this moment only raising." Further,

if we clearly warn the Allies of our resolve to withdraw our troops,

they cannot complain of it. Pitt should therefore instruct Lord Auckland

to give clear expression to these ideas. Coburg will then probably argue

as to the extreme importance of clinching the successes already won, and

will therefore urge the Duke of York to besiege Dunkirk, Graveline, and

St. Omer, with a view to drawing him on finally towards Paris. But any

such proceeding is to be resisted. The German Powers will dismember

France; but we, having little military weight, shall probably gain next

to nothing. Far more advantageous will be our action elsewhere, _e.g._,

in the seizure of Cherbourg, Toulon, etc. Richmond ends by requesting of

Pitt the favour of an interview.[221]

 

Either the interview did not take place, or the duke's arguments failed

to lower the sanguine spirits of the Prime Minister to the level of

prudence. All the letters of Pitt at that time exude confidence from

every line. He hopes that Dumouriez will succeed in overthrowing the

regicides at Paris. The backwardness of the Prussians in supporting

Coburg does not deter him from ordering to Flanders all the available

British and mercenary troops, in order to besiege Dunkirk, and otherwise

help the Imperialists. As if this is not enough, on or just before 1st

April he treats with Malouet, the French envoy from Hayti, for the

transfer of that colony to the British Crown; he writes hopefully of

finding a force large enough to make an attempt on the French coast; and

a little later Grenville mentions a Mediterranean campaign. The King,

too, in referring to a recent offer of peace from Paris, writes that the

bounds of "that dangerous and faithless nation" must be greatly

circumscribed before such a proposal can be entertained.[222]

 

Thus France is to be attacked in Flanders, on the north or north-west

coast, on the Mediterranean coast and in Corsica, as well as the West

Indies, by an army which musters scarcely 20,000 effectives. In this

confidence, which wells forth into five distinct schemes, is to be found

the cause for the Jacobin triumphs which shattered the First Coalition.

 

Austria and Prussia were equally puffed up with unreal hopes. At the

conference at Antwerp in the second week of April occurred the first of

the many blunders which helped to rally Frenchmen around the tricolour.

Coburg's promise, in a recent proclamation to Dumouriez and the French

nation, that the Allies would not make conquests at the expense of

France, was warmly disavowed at the first sitting. Accordingly, a few

days later, Coburg issued a second proclamation, announcing the end of

the armistice and omitting all reference to his disinterested views. The

change of tone speedily convinced the French people of the imminence of

schemes of partition. This it was, quite as much as Jacobin fanaticism,

which banded Frenchmen enthusiastically in the defence of the Republic.

Patriotism strengthened the enthusiasm for liberty, and nerved

twenty-five million Frenchmen with a resolve to fling back the

sacrilegious invaders.

 

About this time the French Government sent pacific proposals to London,

which met with no very encouraging reception, Pitt and Grenville

probably regarding them as a means of sowing discord among the Allies,

of worming out their plans, or of gaining time for the French

preparations. It is indeed difficult to believe that they had any other

object. After the defection of Dumouriez and his Staff, France was in a

desperate state, and her rulers naturally sought to gain a brief

respite. Grenville therefore replied that if France really desired to

end the war which she had forced upon England, definite proposals might

be sent to the British headquarters in the Netherlands.[223] None was

sent.

 

Meanwhile, the jealousies of the German Powers, the delay of Austria in

coming to terms with England, and the refusal of Coburg to define his

plan of campaign, paralysed the actions of the Allies and saved France.

As for the British force, it was too weak to act independently; and yet

the pride of George III forbade its fusion in Coburg's army.[224] By the

third week of April the Duke of York had with him 4,200 British

infantry, 2,300 horsemen, besides 13,000 Hanoverians (clamorous for more

pay), and 15,000 Dutch troops of poor quality and doubtful fidelity;

8,000 hired Hessians had not yet arrived.[225] Yet the King and his

Ministers persisted in hoping for the conquest of French Flanders. The

War Office despatch of 16th April specified as the chief aim of the war

the re-conquest of the Low Countries by Austria, "with such extended and

safe frontier as may secure the tranquillity and independence of

Holland." But Pitt and his colleagues, far from concentrating on

Flanders, continued to toy with expeditions to Brittany, Provence,

Corsica, and the West Indies.

 

At first they pressed Coburg to consent to the deviation of the British

force towards Dunkirk; and only on his urgent protest was that

ex-centric move given up until Valenciennes should have fallen. The

Austrian contention was undoubtedly right, as the British Government

grudgingly admitted. The Duke of York's force therefore moved along with

that of Coburg towards that fortress and showed great gallantry in

compelling the French to evacuate the supporting camp of Famars (23rd

May). Early in June the siege of Valenciennes began in earnest. A

British officer described the defence of the French as "obstinate but

not spirited." They made no sorties, and Custine's army of 40,000 men,

which should have sought to raise the siege, did not attack, probably

owing to the unsteadiness and apathy of his troops.[226] This lack of

energy cost him his life; for on 10th July he was ordered back to Paris

and soon went to the guillotine.

 

At that time the Jacobins were in a state of mind in which fury and

despair struggled for the mastery. The outlook was as gloomy as before

Valmy in September 1792. Bad news poured in from all sides. The

Girondins, after the collapse of their power on 2nd June, appealed to

the Departments, and two thirds of France seemed about to support them

against the tyranny of the capital. Had not the Jacobins developed an

organizing power immeasurably superior to that of the moderates, the

royalists, and the Allies, the rule of that desperate minority must

speedily have been swept away. On 12th July the Parisian Government

declared itself at war with the moderates, who now had the upper hand at

Lyons and in neighbouring districts. On that same day Condé (a small

fortress north of Valenciennes) opened its gates. On 22nd July Mainz

surrendered to the King of Prussia; and six days later the Austrian and

British standards were hoisted on the ramparts of Valenciennes.

 

This event raised to its climax the fury of the Jacobins; and on 9th

August the Convention passed with acclamation a decree declaring Pitt to

be an enemy of the human race. This singular manifestation of Gallic

effervescence came about in the following way. The Committee of Public

Safety having presented a report on the scarcity of corn and bread, the

Convention was electrified by the doleful recital. In the ensuing debate

stories are told of men disguised as women who practise insidious

devices among the _queues_ at the bakers' shops. At once the Convention

decrees that men acting thus while in disguise shall be deemed worthy of

death. A deputy named Garnier then suggests that as this is clearly a

device of the infamous Pitt to increase disorder, it shall be declared

lawful to murder him. Couthon, for once speaking the language of

moderation, objects to this proposal as unworthy of the Republic, and

moves that Pitt be declared an enemy of the human race. This is at once

approved as worthy of the humanity and dignity of the Convention. The

decree, then, was obviously a device for shelving the stupid and

bloodthirsty motion of Garnier. The whole discussion may be compared

with Pitt's declaration to the House of Commons on 12th February 1793,

that the war, though undoubtedly provoked by France, would never be

waged by England for motives of vengeance, but merely for the attainment

of security.

 

Why at this time the name of Pitt should have driven the Parisian

legislators half frantic is not easy to see. Up to that time the

exploits of the small British force at Famars and Valenciennes had been

no more than creditable; and it was not till the end of the month that

the news of the entry of Admiral Hood's fleet into Toulon threw Paris

into a frenzy. The decree of 9th August therefore has merely a

psychological interest. When tyrants thundered at the gates of the

Republic, France needed some names the mere sound of which sufficed to

drive her sons to arms. In 1792 it was Brunswick or Condé. When they

ceased to be effective, the populace found others first in Coburg and

finally in Pitt. Other names waxed and waned; but that of the son of

Chatham stood fixed in a dull haze of hatred. Thus, by a singular irony,

the very man who in 1786 had branded with folly those Englishmen who

declared France to be our natural enemy, was now by her banned as the

enemy of the human race. And such he remains for the great majority of

Frenchmen. The hasty and fortuitous phrase of Couthon, which was

designed to save him from the assassin's knife, will doubtless be the

permanent catchword, irremovable by research and explanation.

 

The ravings of the French Convention would soon have ended, had not a

great organizer now appeared. On 17th August 1793 Carnot entered the

Committee of Public Safety, and thenceforth wielded its limitless powers

for purposes of national defence. He was an officer of engineers, and

had eagerly studied the principles of strategy. Throwing himself with

ardour into the Revolution, he became a member of the National Assembly,

and now was charged with the supervision of the War Department. At the

War Committee he had the help of officers scarcely less able. Among them

Mallet du Pan, in an interesting survey of French administrators, names

D'Arçon as largely contributing to the French triumphs at Dunkirk and

Maubeuge. He calls him a soul on fire and full of resource.[227] But the

brain and will of this Committee was Carnot. His application to work for

some twelve or fourteen hours a day, his hold on masses of details, and

his burning patriotism, enabled him to inflame, control, and energize

Frenchmen until they became a nation in arms. Moreover, Carnot had the

invaluable gift of selecting the best commanders. True, the Frenchman

was not hampered by a monarch who regarded the army as his own, nor by

clogging claims of seniority. The "organizer of victory" had before him

a clear field and no favour.

 

The most urgent danger for the Republic soon proved to be not in

Flanders, but in Brittany and la Vendée. There _la petite noblesse_ and

the peasantry still lived on friendly terms. They were alike shocked by

the expulsion of the orthodox priests and the murder of the King.

Summoned by the Republic to arms in the spring of 1793, they rushed to

arms against her. In la Vendée, the densely