William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

of

the Sardinian contingent was based on the treaty obligations of that

Power rather than on probable performance; while that for the Spaniards

is strangely beneath the mark. How boyishly hopeful also to suppose that

the British forces destined for the future conquest of Corsica could

spare a contingent for service in Provence in the spring of 1794, and

that the nervous little Court of Turin would send an _additional_ body

of 11,000 men far into France. Thus early in Pitt's strategic

combinations we can detect the vitiating flaw. He did not know men, and

therefore he did not know Cabinets. He believed them to be acting

according to his own high standard of public duty and magnanimous

endeavour. Consequently he never allowed for the calculating meanness

which shifted the burdens on to other shoulders.

 

The one factor on which he had a right to count was the despatch of a

respectable force of Austrians from the Milanese by way of Genoa. The

Austrian Governor of Milan promised to send 5,000 men; but not a man

ever stirred.[251] Hood did not hear this disappointing news till 24th

November.[252] He at once sent off to London an urgent request for

succour; and orders were given _on 23rd December_ (the day after the

arrival of the news) for three regiments to sail from Cork for his

relief. Thus it came about that 12,000 Allies were left unsupported at

Toulon to bear the brunt of attacks of some 40,000 Frenchmen now

directed by a genius. O'Hara, who took over the command on his arrival

on 27th October, at once gave a verdict consonant with his pessimistic

character. Hood wrote on the morrow to Dundas: "General O'Hara has just

been with me and alarmed me much. He says our posts are not tenable and

that we are in a dangerous situation for lack of troops that can be

relied upon. And, what is very unpleasant, is the conduct of the

Spaniards, who are striving for power here." On 11th November O'Hara

reported that, in the absence of engineer officers, the forts had been

injudiciously constructed; that their garrisons began to suffer from

exposure to the bleak weather; that the broken and wooded country

greatly favoured the advance of the enemy, and hampered all efforts to

dislodge him; that the Spaniards and Sardinians had no artillery, tools,

or camp equipments; and that the only means of securing Toulon was to

have an army capable of taking the field.[253] Hood and he therefore

counted the hours for the arrival of 5,000 Austrians from Genoa, and of

troops from England.

 

The difficulties of the Allies were enhanced by the disputes which soon

arose between the British and Spaniards as to the command of the

garrison. The tactful Gravina having been badly wounded in driving the

French from Mount Faron, Langara put in a claim that his successor

should be commander-in-chief of the allied forces (23rd October). To

this Hood stoutly demurred, on the ground that he received Toulon in

trust before the Spaniards appeared; and, though it was true that the

Spanish troops outnumbered the British, yet the command of the

Neapolitan and Sardinian contingents belonged of right to the

subsidizing Power. He therefore claimed the supreme command for General

O'Hara. This matter caused much annoyance at Madrid, where that rankling

sore, Nootka Sound, was still kept open by the all-powerful Minister,

Alcudia. Hood's testiness increased the friction at Toulon. The

Spaniards were justified in claiming equality at that fortress; for only

by their arrival did the position become tenable; and the joint

proclamations of Hood and Langara formed a tacit admission of that

equality. But Pitt early resolved to take a firm stand on this subject.

On 17th October, in discussing the instructions for Sir Gilbert Elliot,

the British Commissioner designated for Toulon, he declared that we must

appoint him governor of that town in consequence of its surrender to

us.[254]

 

Pitt kept up this stiff attitude, and on 30th November stated to St.

Helens that, as Toulon surrendered to Hood alone (Langara having

declined to share in the original enterprise) England must appoint the

commander-in-chief, especially as she could not transfer to a Spaniard

the command of her subsidized Allies. The despatch concluded thus: "His

Majesty has in no case any view upon that place different from that

which has been avowed in his name--that at the conclusion of peace that

port should be restored to the crown of France and that in the interval

it should serve in His Majesty's hands as a means of carrying on the war

and as a pledge of indemnity to him and his Allies, including the Crown

of Spain, whose claim to indemnity His Majesty has so distinctly

avowed."[255]

 

These words were added because the French Royalists and the Spaniards

asserted that England's high-handed conduct at Toulon arose from her

resolve to make of it a second Gibraltar. The insinuation struck home

then, and has been widely repeated.[256] But, on the first receipt of

the news of the gain of Toulon, Grenville declared explicitly to the

Austrian Court "that whatever indemnification is to be acquired by this

country must be looked for in the foreign settlements and colonies of

France."[257] As we shall see in later chapters, Corsica and the French

West Indies were the acquisitions aimed at by the Pitt Ministry.

 

Some colour was given to this charge by the refusal of the British

Government to allow the Comte de Provence, the _soi-disant_ Regent of

France, to proceed to Toulon. Grenville even instructed Francis Drake,

our envoy at Genoa, to prevent him embarking at that port. At first

sight this conduct seems indefensible, especially as the Court of Madrid

favoured the Prince's scheme. It must be remembered, however, that the

British Government had consistently refused to acknowledge the Prince as

Regent, and was now exceedingly annoyed with him for announcing his

resolve to go to Toulon, without first applying for permission to

George III.[258] This violation of etiquette prejudiced his case from

the outset. Further, the Royalists of Toulon had declared for

Louis XVII, and a majority of them throughout France opposed the claim

of "Monsieur" to the Regency. The constitution of 1791 gave him no such

right on his own initiative; and, as Toulon stood for that constitution,

not for the "pure" royalism which he now championed, his arrival would

place the garrison "at the discretion of wild and hot-headed emigrants

and expose them to the reproaches and discontents of the Regent's

Court."[259] Besides, what could the Regent of France do in Toulon, a

town closely besieged and in danger of being taken? His dignity and

influence would be far better maintained by remaining at large than by

proceeding thither.[260]

 

Finally, the two princes had given no assurance or promise that they

would recognize the claims of the Allies to indemnities from France for

the expenses of the war.[261] On this last matter the _émigrés_ were

beginning to raise shrill protests at London; and it was certainly wise

to come to some understanding with the princes on this point before

they were put in possession of Provence. Pitt and Grenville were not

made of the same stuff as the Ministers in power in 1815, who demanded

no return for the sacrifices of blood and treasure in the Waterloo

campaign. None the less, it is certain that Pitt and his cousin had no

thought of keeping either Dunkirk or Toulon, save as a pledge for the

acquisition of some of the French West Indies and Corsica.[262] This was

hinted at plainly in the British Declaration issued at Toulon on 20th

November:

 

    That altho' at the conclusion of peace, we shall think ourselves

    entitled to stipulate such terms as may afford just security to

    ourselves and our Allies, and a reasonable indemnification for

    the risks and expenses of a war in which, without any

    provocation on our part, we have been compelled to engage, yet

    that, for our part our views of indemnification can only have

    relation to places not on the Continent of Europe.

 

After this explicit statement, there ought to have been no bickerings

about British aggrandisement at Toulon. Some of the hot-heads in that

town (echoed by Fox later on at Westminster) chose to consider the

Declaration as an infraction of Hood's promise that he would hold Toulon

merely in trust for Louis XVII. The difference, however was not vital.

Pitt and Grenville intended to hold Toulon merely as a pledge that the

British claims to an indemnity elsewhere would be satisfied. Spain had

most cause for annoyance with the Declaration, inasmuch as she, though

having a superior number of troops in that town, was neither allowed to

consider it as a pledge for her future indemnities, nor to share in its

government. It was confided to three Commissioners--Sir Gilbert Elliot,

Hood, and O'Hara, Elliot being virtually Governor.

 

In one other matter the Courts of St. James and of Madrid were at

variance. The latter urged the need of speedily removing the French

warships from Toulon to a Spanish port, or of making preparations for

burning them. Whereas Pitt, who regarded Toulon, not as a windfall, but

as a base of operations for a campaign in Provence, maintained that such

conduct must blight their prospects. With phenomenal stupidity, Langara

allowed his secret instructions on this topic to leak out, thereby

rousing the rage of the Toulonese and the contempt of his British

colleagues. The Duke of Alcudia (better known as Godoy) expressed

sincere regret for this _bêtise_. But the mischief was done. The French

royalists thenceforth figured as traitors who had let in a band of

thieves intent only on the seizure of the French warships.

 

As if this were not enough, Hood quarrelled with our military officers,

with results highly exasperating to our land forces.[263] These last did

not shine during the siege. True, in the sortie of 29th November they

captured a battery recently erected north of Malbosquet; but, their

eagerness exceeding their discipline, they rushed on, despite orders to

remain in the battery, like a pack of hounds after a fox (wrote

Hood);[264] whereupon the French rushed upon them, driving them back

with heavy loss. O'Hara, while striving to retrieve the day, was wounded

and captured. His mantle of gloom devolved upon Major-General David

Dundas, a desponding officer, who had recently requested leave to return

on furlough on the ground of ill health and inability to cope with the

work. This general's letters to his ever confident relative, Henry

Dundas, at Whitehall, were always in a minor key. In his eyes the

Spanish troops were "everything that is bad"; half of the Toulonese were

hostile to the Allies; and the latter were heavily handicapped by having

to defend their own fleets. There was some truth in this; but the

whining tone of the letters, due to ill health, drew from the Minister a

stinging retort, to the effect that the occupation of Toulon had taken

Ministers wholly by surprise; that they had done their best to comply

with the new demands for troops, and expected their general not to look

at his own difficulties alone, but to remember those of the enemy and

endeavour to beat him.[265]

 

This was the spirit in which Hood faced the problem. Even at the close

of November, when all hope of the arrival of the 5,000 Austrians was

past, he refused to listen to David Dundas's advice for the evacuation

of Toulon; and surely this pertinacity was consonant with the traditions

of the British navy, and of the army in its better days; but out of

this question arose a feud between army and navy which developed in

Corsica with disastrous results. Ministers strove to send all the

succour available. But they did not hear until 22nd December that the

5,000 Austrians were being withheld. Henry Dundas's letter of the 28th

also breathes deep concern at the news that Sir R. Boyd had not

forwarded from Gibraltar the reinforcements ordered thence. Further, it

appears from an official estimate drawn up at Whitehall on 18th

December, that the troops already at or ordered to Toulon were believed

to be as follows: British, 2,828; Spanish, 4,147; Sardinians, 2,162;

Neapolitans, 8,600. Dundas also included the 1,100 British troops

ordered from Gibraltar (where at that time there was no chance of an

attack), and 2,361 men under directions to sail from Cork, but which

could not stir owing to the non-arrival of the transports.[266] The

resulting total of 21,198 is, of course, merely a sign of Henry Dundas's

optimism. But obviously Ministers were unaware of the acute crisis at

Toulon at the time of its surrender. In the age of telegraphy, that

disaster would have been averted. The delays of the Austrians, and the

muddles at Gibraltar and Cork, would have been known betimes.

 

Strange to say, there was at that time lying at anchor at Spithead a

force under Lord Moira's command, destined for Brittany, but held back

for various causes, which would probably have turned the balance at

Toulon, had Ministers known of the dire need of