William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

chair; but the envoy quickly

repelled the slight and vindicated the honour of the Republic by

occupying the largest arm-chair available. After this preliminary

skirmish things went more smoothly; but only the briefest summary of

their conversation can be given here. Chauvelin assured Grenville of the

desire of France to respect the neutrality of the Dutch, though they had

fired on two French vessels entering the Scheldt. The opening of that

river, he said, was a right decreed by Nature, and confirmed to France

by the conquest of Brabant--a point which he pressed Grenville to

concede. He then charged England with unfriendly conduct in other

respects. In reply Grenville said that he welcomed this informal

explanation, but he declined to give any assurance on the Scheldt

affair. If (said he) France and England were not on good terms, it was

not the fault of the latter Power, which had consistently remained

neutral but declined to allow the rights of its Allies to be

violated.[128]

 

Equally firm, though more affable, was the behaviour of Pitt in an

interview of 2nd December with a Frenchman who was destined to become

Foreign Minister under Napoleon. Maret, the future Duc de Bassano, at

this time made a very informal _début_ on the stage of diplomacy.

Despite many statements to the contrary it is certain that he had no

official position in England. He came here merely in order to look after

the affairs of the Duke of Orleans, especially to bring back his

daughter, who had for some time resided in Suffolk with Mme. de Genlis

and "Pamela." Maret's own words to Miles are decisive on this point: "I

was not a secret agent; I had no authority to treat, nor had I any

mission; and in declaring this to Mr. Pitt and to you I said nothing but

the truth."[129] With characteristic mendacity Lebrun afterwards

informed the Convention that Maret was a secret agent and that Pitt had

requested an interview with him. The interview came about owing to the

exertions of William Smith, M.P., a well-intentioned Whig, who hoped

much from an informal conversation between Pitt and one of the head

clerks of the French Foreign Office. Chauvelin viewed it with jealousy,

it being his aim to represent Maret as an emissary to the British and

Irish malcontents.[130] Pitt, when he granted the interview, cannot have

known of this, or of the design of Lebrun ultimately to foist Maret into

the place of Morgues at the French Embassy. Accordingly he welcomed

Maret cordially. No tactical skirmish about chairs took place, and Maret

afterwards declared that the great Minister behaved affably throughout,

brightening his converse at times by a smile. As the personality of the

two statesmen and the gravity of the crisis invest this interview with

unique interest, Pitt's account of it, which is in the Pretyman MSS.,

must be given almost in full.

 

    He [Maret] expressed his regret at the distant and suspicious

    terms on which England and France appeared to stand, his

    readiness to give me any _éclaircissement_ he could, and his

    belief that the present French Government would be very glad if

    means could be found by private agents, with no official

    character, to set on foot a friendly explanation.

 

    I told him that, if they were desirous of such an explanation,

    it seemed to me much to be wished under the critical

    circumstances; as we might by conversing freely learn whether it

    was possible to avoid those extremities which we should very

    much regret but which seemed from what we saw of the conduct and

    designs of France to be fast approaching; and I then mentioned

    to him distinctly that the resolution announced respecting the

    Scheldt was considered as proof of an intention to proceed to a

    rupture with Holland; that a rupture with Holland on this ground

    or any other injurious to their rights, must also lead to an

    immediate rupture with this country; and that altho' we should

    deeply regret the event and were really desirous of preserving,

    if possible, the neutrality to which we had hitherto adhered, we

    were fully determined, if the case arose, to give our utmost

    support to our ally.

 

    His answer was that he hoped nothing of the sort would happen;

    that he believed there was no design of proceeding to

    hostilities against Holland; and that it was much the wish of

    the French Government to be on good terms with this country;

    that they wished to _ménager l'Angleterre_, and therefore to

    _ménager l'Hollande_; that these were the sentiments of M. le

    Brun when he left Paris about 3 weeks ago; that he believed them

    to be those of M. Dumouriez; and that, from the despatches of M.

    Chauvelin, which he had seen while here, he believed they

    continued to be those of the _Conseil Exécutif_; that he thought

    a confidential explanation on this subject very desirable; and

    would either go to Paris or write to M. le Brun, to state what

    had passed in our conversation, and that he was persuaded they

    would be disposed to [send?] some other person here to enter

    privately into negotiations upon it. He afterwards dropped an

    idea that some difficulty might perhaps arise from the _Conseil

    Exécutif_ feeling itself pressed by the weight of public opinion

    to propose to us to receive some person here in a formal

    character. To this I observed that the circumstances would by no

    means admit of any formal communication, and that they would

    certainly see the necessity of avoiding the difficulties which

    must arise from such a proposal, if they were sincere in wishing

    an explanation with a view to remove obstacles.

 

    Towards the end of the conversation, on his repeating his belief

    that it would be the wish of the French Government to have such

    an explanation and to remove, if possible, the grounds of

    misunderstanding, I remarked to him that, if this was really

    desired, there was another point which must be attended to--that

    he must have seen the impression made here by the decree in

    France avowing a design of endeavouring to extend their

    principles of government by raising disturbances in other

    countries; that, while this was professed or attempted, and till

    we had full security on this point, no explanation could answer

    its purpose, and that such a conduct must be considered as an

    act of hostility to neutral nations. He answered that he knew

    the impression which this circumstance produced, and had seen

    the decree I mentioned with consternation; that he believed it

    passed only in a moment of fermentation and went beyond what was

    intended; that it could be meant only against nations at war,

    and was considered as one way of carrying on war against them;

    that he believed it was not conformable to the sentiments of the

    _Conseil Exécutif_, and that they might possibly find means to

    revise it. To this I said that, whatever were the sentiments of

    the _Conseil Exécutif_, the decree, as it stood, might justly be

    considered by any neutral nation as an act of hostility. He

    concluded by saying that he would immediately send to M. le Brun

    an account of what had passed, which he hoped might lead to

    happy consequences.

 

Maret prefaced his report of this interview by assuring Lebrun that Pitt

was decidedly in favour of peace, and in fact dreaded war more than the

Whig aristocrats; but, he added, Lord Hawkesbury and the majority of

Ministers were for war--a somewhat doubtful statement. Maret's

description of the interview is graphic but far from complete. He

reported Pitt's gracious effort to minimize the difficulties of form

arising from the lapse of official relations between France and England.

But (he wrote) the Minister's brow darkened at the mention of the names

of Noël and Chauvelin; and he finally suggested that Maret should be the

accredited French agent at London.[131]

 

Pitt's account does not name these personal details, and it lays more

stress on the difficulties caused by the French decrees opening the

Scheldt and offering help to malcontents. We must further remember that

Maret's words of warning to his compatriots on the latter subject were

suppressed in the version published at Paris, which therefore gave the

impression that Pitt was not deeply moved by recent events. This

_suppressio veri_ partly accounts for the persistence of the French

deputies in their resolves, which prevented the friendly explanations

undoubtedly desired by Pitt and Maret.

 

Bad news also came in from The Hague, to the effect that the French were

demanding a passage through the Dutch fortress of Maestricht. These

tidings caused the worst impression. Grenville wrote in reply to

Auckland on 4th December. "The conduct of the French in all their late

proceedings appears to His Majesty's servants to indicate a fixed and

settled design of hostility against this country and the [Dutch]

Republic." Equally threatening were "their almost undisguised attempts

now making to excite insurrection here and in Holland." Consequently His

Majesty had decided to arm in self defence, and he hoped that the Dutch

would firmly repel all attempts derogatory to their neutrality. The King

(he added), while taking these precautionary measures, would not omit

such steps as might lead to friendly explanations with France through

the private agents of that Government; but no ambassador would be

received.[132] Pitt and Grenville set little store by the soothing

explanations of Dumouriez and his friend, Maulde, who had made overtures

to Auckland which met with a guarded but not unfavourable response. On

their renewal, Auckland received them coldly, remarking that the whole

situation was changed by the late violent decrees of the French

Convention. At that time, too, the friendly Maulde was recalled and

replaced by Tainville, "a professed Jacobin with brutal manners and

evident indiscretion,"[133] Thus faded away the last faint hopes in that

quarter.

 

Equally sombre was the outlook at Paris. The pacific reports sent by

Maret and Maulde from London and The Hague were before the French

Ministers at their meeting on 5th December. They had also the benefit of

a lucid and suggestive _Mémoire_ sent by Talleyrand from London a week

earlier, setting forth the desirability of a friendly understanding

between the two free peoples, who, advancing hand in hand, might give

liberty to backward peoples (especially Spanish America), and draw

thence boundless benefits. It was the plan which Dumouriez and he had

drawn up in the spring of that year. Probably the Executive Council took

no notice of it; for certain papers found in the iron chest at the

Tuileries cast doubts on the purity of Talleyrand's patriotism. Further,

as Pache, Minister at War, hated Dumouriez, personal bias told strongly

against the moderate proposals coming from London and The Hague.

Nevertheless the Executive Council now decided to defer for the present

the invasion of Holland, meanwhile chasing the Austrians beyond the

Rhine, and fortifying Antwerp. The last step was declared not to

infringe the principles of the Republic, "which oppose the spirit of

conquest."

 

Obviously there was nothing to prevent the same liberal adaptation of

these principles to Belgium as Grégoire had proposed for the welfare of

the Savoyards. A few deputations of the liberated people, asking for

union with France, would enable some equally skilful dialectician to

discover that Belgium was naturally a part of the Republic. For the

present, however, the Belgians sent a deputation to demand unconditional

independence; and it taxed the ingenuity even of Barère, then President

of the Convention, to waive aside that request, with airy phrases as to

the alliance of the two peoples emanating from the hands of Nature

herself (4th December).[134]

 

Pitt cannot have heard of the French Cabinet's decision of 5th December,

but he must have read of the ambiguous treatment of the Belgians at the

bar of the Convention the day previously. It had long been a maxim at

Whitehall that the Pays Bas must never go to France. To prevent such a

disaster England had poured forth blood and treasure for more than a

century. Pitt's resolve two years before, to maintain Austrian authority

in those provinces, had deeply offended Prussia. Now he and Grenville

turned to the Court of Vienna, and on 7th December made friendly

overtures to Stadion, Austrian ambassador at London.[135] Thus, the

French menace ended the long period of estrangement between Great

Britain and Austria, though, as will duly appear, mutual confidence took

root very slowly.

 

On 9th December Lebrun sent off an important despatch to Chauvelin. With

respect to the decree of 19th November, it stated that France would

never demean herself by assisting rioters, but would respond to the

"general will" of a people that desired to break its chains. Further,

France could not reverse her decision concerning the Scheldt. She would

not