William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

revolutionize Holland, but she expected Great Britain not to

intervene in support of a constitution which the Dutch considered

"vicious and destructive of their interests." Finally, the French

Government could not recognize the guarantees of the Dutch constitution

undertaken by England and Prussia in 1788.[136] On the same day Lebrun

sent a message to Maret, who was still in London, adverting in ironical

terms to the military preparations in England, at which the French would

feel no alarm, and insinuating that the doctrines of liberty were making

rapid progress there. As to negotiations, the only bases on which they

could proceed were the recognition of the Republic, and the refusal of

the French Cabinet to treat except by a fully accredited envoy.

 

On receipt of this letter on the 14th, Maret at once showed it to Miles,

who urged him to request an immediate interview with the Prime Minister.

This was accorded, and at 8 p.m. of that day, Maret met Pitt again. I

have found no account of this interview. All we know is that it was

short and depressing. Maret had to impart the unwelcome news that all

the communications to the French Government must pass through the hands

of Chauvelin--a personal triumph for that envoy. Pitt on his side

declined to give any answer on the subject of Maret's communication, or

on that of receiving Chauvelin.[137] We can imagine that under that

stiff and cold exterior the Prime Minister concealed deep agitation; for

the determination of the French rigidly to adhere to their decrees, to

force Chauvelin upon the British Government, and to require the

recognition of the French Republic, meant war.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[83] Aulard, "La Rév. Franç.," 270-2.

 

[84] "Dropmore P.," ii, 291.

 

[85] "Bland Burges P.," 207, 211.

 

[86] Dumont, "Souvenirs"; Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters"

(Talleyrand).

 

[87] W. A. Miles, "Corresp.," i, 349-51; Sorel, iii, 18-20.

 

[88] Burke, "Corresp.," iv, 7.

 

[89] Sorel, iii, 139.

 

[90] Carlyle, "Fr. Rev.," iii, bk. i, ch. vi.

 

[91] "Mems. of Romilly," i, 351, 352.

 

[92] "Dropmore P.," ii, 318.

 

[93] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 19, 20.

 

[94] _Ibid._ In all, 3,772 French refugees landed in September 1792

("Ann. Reg." 39). The first subscription for them realized £1,468. Burke

gave £20.

 

[95] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21; Twiss, "Life of Lord Eldon," i,

218; "Bland Burges P.," 203. Our agent, Munro, on 17th December 1792

reported from Paris: "Dr. Maxwell has at last obtained a company in the

French service, and I understand is soon to leave this to join the army"

(Gower's "Despatches," 260). Mr. Elgar has not been able to trace him

afterwards.

 

[96] Massey, iv, 45. This was said to be spoken to Bland Burges; but the

papers of the latter (p. 204) contain no reference to it.

 

[97] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21.

 

[98] _Ibid._

 

[99] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21.

 

[100] Miles ("Corresp.," 333) states that the editors of the "Argus" and

"Morning Chronicle" were regularly paid by the French Embassy and were

often there.

 

[101] "Bland Burges P.," 227-9.

 

[102] Virgil, "Georgics," i, 463-5. "Who would dare call the sun a liar?

In truth, he often warns of the approach of hidden seditions and of the

swellings of treachery and strifes yet unseen."

 

[103] "F. O.," France, 40.

 

[104] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 22.

 

[105] "Dropmore P.," ii, 322.

 

[106] "Auckland Journals," ii, 449, 455; "Dropmore P.," ii, 324.

 

[107] Sorel, iii, 143.

 

[108] "Auckland Journals," ii, 465.

 

[109] On 24th November Noël wrote from London to Lebrun: "Tous les

symptômes annoncent que les mouvements révolutionnaires ne peuvent être

éloignés." Quoted by Sorel, iii, 214. See, too, Ernouf's "Maret," p. 84.

 

[110] "Auckland Journals," ii, 481. Tomline, iii, 458, 459. Burke's

unfortunate phrase in the "Reflections": "Learning will be cast into the

mire and trodden down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude."

 

[111] B.M. Place MSS., vol. entitled "Libel, Sedition, Treason,

Persecution."

 

[112] "Moniteur," 29th November 1792.

 

[113] "Residence in France in 1792-5," by an English Lady, i, 190-2.

 

[114] Auckland says ("Journals," ii, 473) he has seen Paris bulletins

and letters which counted absolutely on a revolt in England.

 

[115] "Dropmore P.," ii, 344. Grenville to Auckland, 27th November.

 

[116] _Ibid._, 351-2.

 

[117] Salomon, "Pitt," 599.

 

[118] Rojas, "Miranda dans la Rév. Franç.," 3-4.

 

[119] "Dropmore P.," ii, 339, 341, 343; "Auckland Journals," ii, 471;

Lecky, vi, 70-4.

 

[120] "F. O.," Holland, 20.

 

[121] "F. O.," Austria, 31, 32. See, too, Vivenot, ii, 446, 447.

 

[122] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 89, 90.

 

[123] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 89, 90. This despatch, and the letter of

the Prince of Orange referred to above, correct the statement of Mr.

Browning ("Varennes," etc., 191) and Mr. Hammond ("Fox," 257), that the

Dutch did not call upon us for help. This was asserted by Lord Lansdowne

on 21st December, but his information was unofficial and is refuted by

that given above.

 

[124] Marsh, "Politics of Great Britain and France," i, 260-2. The

militia were not called out in Surrey, Herts, Berks, and Bucks

("Dropmore P.," ii, 348).

 

[125] Pretyman MSS.

 

[126] Pitt to Westmorland, 14th October and 18th November 1792, in

Salomon, "Pitt" (App.); "Dropmore P.," ii, 318, 320-3, 328, 330, 333,

336; "Mems. of Lord Ed. Fitzgerald," 155-60.

 

[127] Pretyman MSS.

 

[128] "F. O.," France, 40. For Grenville's account of the interview, see

"Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."

 

[129] Miles, "Correspondence," ii, 46; see, too, Ernouf, "Maret," 89,

This corrects the mis-statement of Lecky (vi, 94) on this topic.

 

[130] Ernouf, "Maret," 90.

 

[131] "Ann. Reg." (1792), 190-3; Ernouf, "Maret," 94-8.

 

[132] "F. O.," Holland, 41; B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to

Auckland, 4th December.

 

[133] "F. O.," Holland, 42. Auckland to Grenville, 7th and 8th December

See, too, Miles, "Correspondence," i, 382; Sorel, iii, 224.

 

[134] Sorel, iii, 204, 224.

 

[135] Vivenot, ii, 393.

 

[136] Sorel, iii, 225, 226.

 

[137] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 388, 389.

 

CHAPTER IV (THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE)

 

    La guerre aux rois était la conséquence naturelle du procès fait

    au roi de France; la propagande conquérante devait être liée au

    régicide.--SOREL.

 

 

The opening of Parliament on 13th December 1792 took place amidst

circumstances that were depressing to friends of peace. Affairs were

gyrating in a vicious circle. Diplomacy, as we have seen, had come to a

deadlock; but more threatening even than the dispute between Pitt and

Lebrun were the rising passions of the two peoples. The republican

ferment at Paris had worked all the more strongly since 20th November,

the date of the discovery of the iron chest containing proofs of the

anti-national intrigues of the King and Queen. Hence the decree (3rd

December) for the trial of Louis XVI at the bar of the Convention with

its inevitable sequel, the heating of royalist passion in all

neighbouring lands. It is one of the many mishaps of the revolutionary

movement that its enthusiasm finally aroused an opposite enthusiasm, its

fury begot fury, and thus set in a series of cyclones which scarcely

spent their force even at Waterloo.

 

An essentially philosophic movement at the outset, the French Revolution

was now guided by demagogues and adventurers, whose only hope of keeping

erect lay in constant and convulsive efforts forwards. Worst symptom of

all, its armies already bade fair to play the part of the Praetorians of

the later Roman Empire. Nothing is more singular at this time than the

fear of the troops. Amidst the distress prevalent at Paris, much

apprehension was felt at the return of the armies of Custine and

Dumouriez. In part, of course, this uneasiness arose from a suspicion

that these men, especially the latter, might take up the _rôle_ of Monk

and save Louis. But a member of the French Convention assured Miles that

the disbanding of those tumultuary forces would bring on a social

crisis.

 

    War, [he wrote on 9th December] is to a certain extent

    inevitable, not so much for the purpose of opening the Scheldt,

    for that is rather a pretext in order to animate the people and

    preserve their enthusiasm, but to get rid of 300,000 armed

    vagabonds, who can never be allowed to return without evident

    risk to the Convention and Executive Council.... It is her

    opinion [Madame Roland's] and mine that we cannot make peace

    with the Emperor without danger to the Republic, and that it

    would be hazardous to recall an army, flushed with victory and

    impatient to gather fresh laurels, into the heart of a country

    whose commerce and manufactures have lost their activity, and

    which would leave the disbanded multitude without resources or

    employment.[138]

 

These words are noteworthy; for they show that prudential or party

motives led some at least of the Girondins, formerly friends of England,

to desire an extension of the war.

 

In England, too, the war spirit was rising. The traditional loyalty of

the land had been strengthened by the tactful behaviour of George III

since Pitt's accession to power. These feelings warmed to a steady glow

at the time of the King's illness in 1788-9; and now the trial of

Louis XVI, albeit on grounds which Britons could not understand, seemed

an act of contemptible cruelty. To bring Louis from Versailles to Paris,

to load him with indignities at the Tuileries, to stop his despairing

bolt for freedom, to compass his downfall, to attack him in his palace

and massacre his defenders, to depose him, and now to try him for his

life for the crime of helping on his would-be deliverers, appeared to a

nation of sportsmen a series of odious outrages on the laws of fair

play. The action of certain Radical Clubs in sending addresses of

congratulation to the National Convention also aroused deep disgust; and

(as Bland Burges wrote to Auckland on 18th December) Loyal Associations

sprang up on all sides.[139] A typical address was sent by the Dover

Association to Pitt, as Lord Warden, on 19th December, asking for

permission to take arms in defence of King and Constitution against

invaders from without or levellers within.[140] The example was widely

followed; and thus, as usually happens in this land, the puny

preparations of Government were helped on by the eager exertions of the

people.

 

The revulsion in public opinion early in December was so marked as to

impress even Chauvelin. He warned Lebrun that within a month the English

had so changed as scarcely to be recognizable; but he added: "Pitt seems

to have killed public opinion in England." A conversation which Sheridan

had with him on 7th December ought to have disproved this fable. The

Whig orator sternly reprobated the French decree of 19th November,

offering aid to malcontents, and stated that the Opposition desired

peace with France, but not if she attacked Holland. Nine-tenths of the

people would resent any attempt to interfere with England or her Allies.

 

This patriotic utterance of Sheridan expressed the feelings of a large

part of the Whig Opposition. Parliament on 13th December showed marked

approval of the King's Speech, which, while affirming his peaceful

intentions, asserted his resolve to strengthen the forces. Lansdowne and

Stanhope struck a few jarring notes; but in the Commons the Opposition

was almost paralysed by a split between the New and Old Whigs. At a

meeting of the party, held on 11th December at Burlington House, the

majority decided to support the Government. Indeed Parliament would

probably have presented a united front but for the action of Lansdowne,

Stanhope, and Fox. Much depended on the conduct of the great orator at

this crisis. A warning uttered by him to French Republicans might have

had the most salutary effect. Unfortunately