William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

respecting the saving

of Louis. Now, where the life of a King was at stake, any communication

must have been official, and if it were made through the Spanish

ambassador in London, Grenville would certainly have referred to it in

his despatches to Madrid.[151] We may therefore dismiss Godoy's story as

a cruel and baseless slander, due to the spiteful desire of a

discredited politician to drag down a great name nearer to his own

level.

 

It is also worth noting that Malouet, who was then in close touch with

Grenville on San Domingo affairs, does not mention in his Memoirs any

attempt to involve the Cabinet in a scheme for bribing the

Convention--an action which the French exiles in England and Holland

were perfectly able to carry out themselves had they been so minded. The

only document bearing on this question is a Memorial drawn up on 7th

December by Malouet, Lally-Tollendal, and Gillier, stating their horror

at the King's trial, and their belief that his life might be spared if

George III and the British Government issued a Declaration stating their

lively interest in Louis XVI and his family, their resolve for ever to

refuse an asylum to all regicides, and to cut off all supplies of food

from France if the crime were committed.[152] The Memorial was probably

presented to Lord Grenville; but its inutility, or danger, in the proud

and exacting mood then prevalent at Paris, is obvious. The confidential

reports sent by "M. S." from Paris to Lord Grenville do not refer to any

such overture to the Cabinet.[153]

 

Lastly, there is the curious fact that the ex-abbé Noël, one of

Chauvelin's "advisers," came to Miles late on 18th December, and

affected much concern at the prospect of the execution of Louis. He then

suggested that Pitt should confer with a M. Talon, residing in Sloane

Street, who had immense resources and stood well with all parties in

France, in order to devise some means for saving the life of that

monarch. When Miles asked Noël how Pitt was to assist in this laudable

project, no answer was forthcoming. We must commend Noël's prudence; for

he had already stated that Talon was under impeachment in France. How a

man accused of treason could help his King, save by secretly using some

of his immense resources to bribe the deputies, is no more apparent to

us than it was to Miles. In fact he detected a snare in this effort to

associate Pitt with a wealthy French exile in what must evidently be

merely an affair of bribery. He therefore declined to bring the matter

before Pitt, whereupon Noël betrayed signs of satisfaction at finding

that the Minister really was neutral on French internal affairs.[154]

This little episode should open the eyes of detractors of Pitt to the

extraordinary difficulty of his position. Of one thing we may be

certain. The readiest way of assuring the doom of the hapless monarch

was to take up some one of the silly or guileful schemes then mooted for

pressing the British Government to take sides in the trial. Pitt's

rigorous neutrality was the best means of helping the advocates of Louis

in their uphill fight with the hostile Convention.

 

Reverting to events at Westminster, we note that Ministers, on 21st

December, introduced into the Upper House an Aliens Bill for subjecting

to supervision the many thousands of foreigners who had flocked to these

shores. The debates on this measure showed some approach to unanimity,

though Lansdowne and Lauderdale in the Lords, and Fox in the Commons

opposed it as a breach of the hospitable traditions of this land. On the

28th Burke spoke in its support with his usual passion, flinging down a

Birmingham dagger as a sign of the French fraternity now introduced

into these happy islands.[155] After a few alterations in committee, the

Bill passed on the last day of the year.

 

Meanwhile, on 18th December, Lebrun had sent to the Convention a report

on the negotiations, which was not adapted to soften the passions of the

time, being merely a piece of parliamentary declamation; but, as

declamation rather than reason held sway at Paris, some of its phrases

must be quoted. After citing with approval passages from the recent

speech of Fox, Lebrun referred to the eager interest taken by the

British nation in the triumphs of the French arms. "But," he continued,

"these glorious events have a quite contrary effect upon the English

Minister. In a moment, the dread and jealousy of our victories, the

entreaties of cowardly rebels [the French _émigrés_], the vile intrigues

of hostile Courts, and the secret suspicions that the numerous addresses

from all parts of England excited, determined him to more decisive

military preparations and to an immediate assembling of Parliament."

Lebrun then accused Pitt of seeking to stir up public opinion against

France, and of exciting, "by the most corrupt means, distrusts, doubts,

and disorders." A still more extraordinary charge followed, namely, that

Pitt and Grenville, while refusing to acknowledge the French diplomatic

agents, had "requested to see them confidentially, to hold

communications with them, and to grant them secret conferences."[156]

Lebrun then referred in contemptuous terms to the British naval

preparations, and stated that he had firmly maintained the decree

respecting the Scheldt. He then affirmed the reasonableness of the

decree of 19th November; and scouted the notion that France harboured

designs against Holland. In answer to this last he had said in effect:

"That it was much to be wished that the British Ministry had never

meddled more with the internal government of that Republic than we

ourselves wish to meddle." Finally, if these disputes led to a rupture,

"the war will be only the war of the British Minister against us; and we

will not fail to make a solemn appeal to the English nation." ... "In

short, we will leave it to the English nation to judge between us, and

the issue of this contest may lead to consequences which he [Pitt] did

not expect."

 

In the sordid annals of party strife this report of Lebrun holds a high

place. In order to furbish up the dulled prestige of the Gironde he

sought to excite national animosity, and to revive the former hatred of

the name of Pitt. What could be more criminal than to sneer at the

smallness of England's naval preparations? What more false than to

charge Pitt and Grenville with secretly begging for interviews with

agents whom outwardly they scorned? It is by acts like these that

nations are set by the ears; and generally they are at one another's

throats before the lie can be exposed. Lebrun's report was received with

loud applause. No one questioned the accuracy of its details; and these

blind followers of a blind guide unanimously voted that it should be

printed and widely circulated. On 20th December Lebrun sent a copy of it

to Chauvelin, along with instructions which lost none of their emphasis

in the note drawn up at Portman Square. He forwarded another copy of the

report to Noël, with this significant explanation: "This document will

keep you in touch with the ideas of this country and will show you that

I scarcely have this affair in my hands any longer."[157]

 

This admission is illuminating. The trial of Louis XVI had, as the men

of the Mountain foresaw, placed the Girondin Ministry and its followers

in a most embarrassing position. Many of them inclined to mercy or to

compromises which found little favour with the populace. Accordingly,

the procedure at the trial, as also the final verdict, turned largely on

the desperate efforts of the Jacobins to discredit their rivals, who

sought by all means to keep their foothold in the revolutionary torrent.

One of the most obvious devices was to represent the Executive Council

as the champion of ultra-democratic ideas as against envious and

reactionary England. If this notion gained currency, Lebrun and his

colleagues might hope still to ride on the crest of the wave.

 

Historical students will remember another occasion when a tottering

Ministry sought to keep pace with public opinion at Paris. The Duc de

Gramont on 12th July 1870 instructed the French ambassador, Benedetti,

to insist on obtaining from King William of Prussia an immediate answer

to a demand that was certain to arouse angry feelings; and he sent to

Benedetti the explanation that public opinion was _outflanking_ the

Ministry, and that "the effervescence of spirits is such that we do not

know whether we shall succeed in mastering it." Thus, twice within

eighty years France was hurried towards the brink of the precipice

because her Foreign Minister could not control an effervescence of

spirits which he himself had helped to excite.

 

Lebrun's missives of 20th December bore fruit seven days later in

Chauvelin's despatch to Grenville. As this document has often been

printed, only a brief summary need be given here. The French envoy

insisted that the conduct of France towards England had throughout been

correct and conciliatory; but the Executive Council had long observed

with concern the unfriendliness of the British Ministers, and now

pressed its envoy to demand definitely whether they held the position of

a neutral or an enemy. The only possible cause of enmity could be a

misinterpretation of the decree of 19th November, which obviously

applied merely to peoples that demanded the fraternal aid of Frenchmen.

As France wished to respect the independence of England and her allies,

she would not attack the Dutch. The opening of the Scheldt, however, was

a question decided irrevocably by reason and justice, besides being a

matter of small moment; and the British Ministers could not venture to

make it a cause of war. If they did, they would not be supported by the

British people. Chauvelin then demanded an official reply, and expressed

the hope that the British Cabinet would not engage in a war for which it

alone would be responsible and to which the people would not accord its

support.[158]

 

What Pitt and Grenville thought of Chauvelin's last effort on behalf of

peace will best appear in Grenville's despatch of 28th December to

Auckland at The Hague:

 

    The tone and language of Chauvelin's note of the 27th appear

    calculated to accelerate a rupture, and the same conclusion

    seems to follow from the circumstance of M. Maret's having

    informed Mr. Pitt that it was not intended by the _Conseil

    Exécutif_ to charge any private agent with any commission of the

    nature which he had himself suggested in his first conference. I

    have some reason to believe that it is now intended to bring

    forward immediately in Holland the same question of receiving

    formal and official communication from the _Conseil Exécutif_. I

    trust that the answer will be conformable to opinions

    entertained here; and, with the view of avoiding as far as

    possible, any difference, however slight, in the expression of

    our sentiments, I shall lose no time in sending to Your

    Excellency the copy of the answer to M. Chauvelin when it is

    settled.

 

    I cannot conclude this dispatch without again urging Your

    Excellency to press in the strongest manner possible upon the

    Dutch Ministers the necessity of immediately bringing forward

    their whole force. It is evident that the present intentions of

    France are those of aggression. Whichever of the Allies is first

    attacked, there can be no doubt under the present circumstances,

    but that they must make common cause in order to render the

    calamity of war short, if it is unavoidable. And if the state of

    the preparations of the Republic is found inadequate to the

    emergency, the attack will certainly be first made there where

    least resistance is expected. Every circumstance therefore, of

    interest and dignity require [_sic_] that no exertion of which

    the Republic can be made capable, should be spared at such a

    moment as the present.[159]

 

Evidently Grenville looked on Chauvelin's note as an ultimatum; and it

is noteworthy that Pitt on 28th December refused to see Chauvelin. Our

Dutch Allies, however, were by no means ready. The separate Admiralties

of the Dutch Provinces had not enough men to equip, still less to man,

their ships; and almost their only defence lay in a British squadron

which set sail for Flushing on or about 29th December.[160]

 

For the present, then, Pitt and Grenville contented themselves with

sending a stiff rejoinder to Chauvelin's note. Grenville reminded him

that he had no official character in this country since the fall of the

French monarchy, and that the sinister meaning of the decree of 19th

November, as shown in the public reception given at Paris to the

promoters of sedition in this country, was in no wise cleared away by

his recent declaration, which still claimed the right to encourage

disloyalty. With regard to the Scheldt question, Grenville declared

again that it was of the highest importance both in point of fact and of

principle; of fact, because the action