William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

of France pre-supposed her

sovereignty of the Low Countries; of principle, because, if passed over,

it would give her the right to abrogate treaties at her will. The desire

of England to preserve strict neutrality in French affairs was

universally acknowledged, and he (Chauvelin) had not urged a single

circumstance in disproof of it. But, England (continued Grenville) "will

never see with indifference that France shall make herself, either

directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general

arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe. If France is really

desirous of maintaining friendship and peace with England, she must show

herself disposed to renounce her views of aggression and aggrandisement,

and to confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other

Governments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without violating

their rights."[161]

 

This stern rebuke to the flippant claim of the French Ministers to

settle the affairs of neighbouring States in accord with their own

principles has often been ascribed to Pitt himself. This is doubtful. I

can find no proof that he intervened directly in the affairs of the

Foreign Office after the accession of Grenville, as he had done in the

days of the Duke of Leeds. Perhaps the austere personality of Grenville

forbade any intervention; or it may be that the two cousins were in so

complete an agreement on principles that Pitt left all details to the

Foreign Minister. Certain it is that he himself remained almost passive

at this time; and all the acts were the acts of Grenville. It was well

known that the two men were in close touch. "I consider his lordship the

same as Mr. Pitt," wrote Miles to Aust.[162]

 

More important is the question--What were the aims of the British

Government for the settlement of Europe? Fortunately, we are able to

answer this without a shadow of doubt. For on 29th December Grenville

sent off a despatch to Whitworth at St. Petersburg referring to an

effusive offer of alliance from Catharine II. Through Vorontzoff, her

envoy at London, she expressed her admiration of the generous conduct of

George III, and her earnest desire to help him in restoring order to

Europe by means of a concert of the Powers, which might be formed at

London. At the same time she found means to instruct her partisans in

the British Parliament to relax their efforts against the Ministry.[163]

Pitt and Grenville were not dazzled by these proposals. The latter

generously declared to Auckland that he did not believe the Opposition

to be influenced by unpatriotic motives; and he doubted the sincerity of

Catharine's offer.[164] Nevertheless, in view of the imminence of a

French attack on Holland, Grenville decided to encourage the Czarina to

form a league of the Powers; but the instructions which he sent on 29th

December to Whitworth set forth aims very different from hers. He

suggested that the Powers not yet at war should invite the French people

to accept the following terms:

 

    The withdrawing of their arms within the limits of the French

    territory: the abandoning their conquests; the rescinding any

    acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other

    nations; and the giving, in some public and unequivocal manner,

    a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles and to

    excite disturbances against their own Governments. In return for

    these stipulations the different Powers of Europe who should be

    parties to this measure might engage to abandon all measures or

    views of hostility against France or interference in their

    internal affairs, and to maintain a correspondence or

    intercourse of amity with the existing powers in that country

    with whom such a treaty may be concluded. [If, however, France

    refuses to give these pledges, then the Powers will take] active

    measures to obtain the ends in view, and it may be considered

    whether, in such a case, they might not reasonably look to some

    indemnity for the expenses and hazards to which they would

    necessarily be exposed.[165]

 

From this remarkable pronouncement it appears that Pitt and Grenville

harboured no hostility to the French Republic as such, provided that it

acted on the principles which it professed up to the end of October

The ensuing acts of aggression and propagandism they unflinchingly

opposed, but in the hope that the combined remonstrances of all the

Powers would induce the French leaders to withdraw their untenable

claims. Above all, the British Cabinet did not refuse eventually to

recognize the new state of things at Paris, a point of view very far

removed from the flaming royalism of Catharine II and Burke. Whether a

concert of the Powers could have been formed on these moderate terms is

very doubtful. What is certain is that Pitt and Grenville saw in it the

chief hope of peace, and that they did not desire to force royalty on

reluctant France. For them the war, if it came, was not a war of

opinion--Monarchy _versus_ Republic. It was a struggle to preserve the

Balance of Power, which in all ages our statesmen had seen to be

incompatible with the sovereignty of France in the Low Countries. That

danger averted, they were content to let France settle her own affairs,

if she behaved with the like tolerance towards her neighbours.

 

Unhappily, these pacific and enlightened views were not accompanied by

conciliatory manners. It was the bane of Pitt, and still more of

Grenville, that their innate reserve often cooled their friends and

heated their opponents.[166] In the case of so vain and touchy a man as

Chauvelin a little affability would have gone a long way; and this was

especially desirable, as he had enough support at Paris to thwart the

attempt to replace him by some envoy less disliked at St. James's.

Nevertheless, they persisted in their resolve not to recognize him

officially; and the Executive Council made it a point of honour to force

him on the British Court. Personal questions therefore told against a

peaceful settlement. Even at the end of the year 1792 it was not wholly

impossible, provided that the questions in dispute were treated with

open-mindedness and a desire to understand the point of view of the

opponent.

 

Undoubtedly it was for the French Government to take the first steps

towards reconciliation by retracting or toning down the decrees of 16th

and 19th November and 15th December, which had brought about the crisis.

Further, the Convention ought to have seen through and thwarted the

attempt of Lebrun to regain popularity by insulting Pitt in the report

of 18th December. Had that body been less intent on the party manoeuvres

centring in the trial of Louis XVI, it would assuredly not have

furthered the insidious designs of that Minister. It might have offered

to recall Chauvelin, and to substitute Maret, a man known to be a

_persona grata_ to Pitt. Finally, in view of the large concourse of

Frenchmen now in London, reckoned at 15,000, the Executive Council would

have done well to say nothing about the passing of the Aliens Bill,

obviously a precautionary measure called for by the emergency.[167]

 

The French Ministers took exactly the contrary course. On 30th December

they decided that Chauvelin should demand the withdrawal of that

measure, as contrary to the treaty of 1786; failing this, France would

declare that compact at an end. They also began to prepare for an

invasion of England, on a plan which came before them on 28th December;

and on the last day of the year, Monge, Minister for the Navy, issued a

circular letter to Friends of Liberty and Equality in the seaports. It

contained passages to the following effect:

 

    The English Government is arming, and the King of Spain,

    encouraged by this, is preparing to attack us. These two

    tyrannical Powers, after persecuting the patriots on their own

    territories, think no doubt that they will be able to influence

    the judgment to be pronounced on the traitor, Louis. They hope

    to frighten us; but no! a people which has made itself free, a

    people which has driven out of the bosom of France, and as far

    as the distant borders of the Rhine, the terrible army of the

    Prussians and Austrians--the people of France will not suffer

    laws to be dictated to them by any tyrant. The King and his

    Parliament mean to make war upon us. Will the English

    republicans suffer it? Already these free men show their

    discontent and the repugnance which they have to bear arms

    against their brothers, the French. Well! We will fly to their

    succour. We will make a descent in the island. We will lodge

    there 50,000 caps of Liberty. We will plant there the sacred

    tree, and we will stretch out our arms to our republican

    brethren. The tyranny of their Government will soon be

    destroyed.

 

What did the famous mathematician think of this effusion in the heyday

of the Empire, when he became Count of Pelusium with a Westphalian

estate bringing in 200,000 francs a year? A collection of the frank

confessions of the _ci-devant_ Jacobins would form an entertaining

volume.

 

Not the least piquant of them would be the criticisms of a Breton

captain, Kersaint, on the bellicose speech which he launched at the

Convention on 1st January 1793. Admitting that Pitt really wanted peace,

while Fox only desired to abase his rival, he averred that the Prime

Minister would try to arrest France in her rapid career of land conquest

either by a naval war or by an armed mediation. War, said Kersaint, must

result, were it only from the perplexities of Pitt and the hatred of

George III for the French Republic. France, then, must threaten to free

the Scottish and Irish nations which England had so long oppressed. The

Republic could appeal with telling effect to the English sailors not to

fight against the champions of the Rights of Man. Further, France need

not fear the British Empire; for it is vulnerable in every sea, on all

the continental markets, while France stands four-square, rooted in her

fertile soil. Let them, then, attack the sources of British wealth which

are easily assailable. "The credit of England rests upon fictitious

wealth, the real riches of that people are scattered everywhere....

Asia, Portugal and Spain are the best markets for English products....

We must attack Lisbon and the Brazils, and carry an auxiliary army to

Tippoo Sultan." As for Spain (continued Kersaint) she could be paralysed

by the revolutionizing of Spanish America--the suggestion of Miranda to

Dumouriez. In fact, Frenchmen need not fear war with all Governments.

Open enmity was better than neutrality. This war would "regulate the

destiny of nations and found the liberty of the world." Accordingly he

proposed to offer to England either war or an alliance; to equip thirty

sail of the line and twenty-four frigates; and to form a Committee of

General Defence. The Convention assented to this last and referred the

other questions to it.

 

Thus opened the terrible year, 1793. The circular letter of Monge and

the speech of Kersaint furnished the weather-gauge for the future. In

them we detect the mental exaltation, the boundless daring, the

overwrought conviction of their neighbours' weakness, which were to

carry Frenchmen up to bewildering heights of glory and overwhelm them in

final disaster. We behold in awful perspective the conquest of Holland,

Italy, and Central Europe, the Irish Rebellion, the Egyptian Expedition,

the war on British commerce, culminating in the Continental System, with

its ensuing campaigns in Spain and Russia, and the downfall of Napoleon.

All this and more can be seen dimly, as in a crystal globe, in that

fateful phrase of Kersaint--"The credit of England rests upon fictitious

wealth."

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

Turning to the last details that preceded the declaration of war, we

notice that on 7th January Chauvelin, acting on the order of Lebrun,

sent in a sharp protest against the Aliens Bill as an infraction of

Pitt's Treaty of Commerce of 1786. On one count Chauvelin certainly had

a right to complain; for, strange to say, the Act was put in operation

against Talleyrand, nominally his adviser, and the champion of the

Anglo-French _entente_. The ex-Bishop of Autun penned an eloquent

protest, which apparently had some effect, for he was not expelled until

March 1794.[168] Far more incisive was Chauvelin's complaint. We can

imagine his feelings when Grenville curtly declined to receive it.[169]

At the same time Grenville refused to discuss or explain the stoppage of

certain cargoes of grain destined for French ports. His private

correspondence with Auckland shows that this measure was due to the fear

that the French would store the corn for the use of the army that was

threatening Holland. That motive of course could not be disclosed to

Chauvelin; and Grenville declined to explain it at all until the

resolutions arrived at in Paris were clearly set forth.

 

On Sunday, 13th January, Chauvelin received from Lebrun a long despatch,

drawn up in