William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

his conduct was such as to

impair the unity of English sentiment and thereby to encourage the

delusions of the men in power at Paris. In the meeting on 11th December

he asserted that there was no fear of a revolt (in which he was

doubtless correct) and that the calling out of the Militia was a mere

trick, which he would strenuously oppose. He admitted that we must

support the Dutch if they were attacked, and disapproved of the French

decree respecting the Scheldt, but strongly deprecated war on that

account. On the 12th he threw caution to the winds, and stated with an

oath that there was no address that Pitt could frame on which he would

not propose an amendment and divide the House.[141] This is party spirit

run mad; but it was in that spirit that Fox went to the House on the

13th.

 

There he made one of his finest flights of oratory. None of his speeches

excels it in beauty of diction and matchless energy of thought. Most

forcible was the passage in which he derided the ministerial maxim that

the canon of English laws and liberties was complete; that we might

thenceforth stand still, and call upon a wondering world to admire it as

a model of human perfection. Even more biting were his taunts at

Ministers for seeking to stamp out the discontent which their injustice

and violence had created.

 

    You have gone upon the principles of slavery in all your

    proceedings; you neglect in your conduct the foundation of all

    legitimate government, the rights of the people; and, setting up

    this bugbear, you spread a panic for the very purpose of

    sanctifying this infringement, while again the very infringement

    engenders the evil which you dread. One extreme naturally leads

    to another. Those who dread republicanism fly for shelter to the

    Crown. Those who desire Reform and are calumniated are driven by

    despair to republicanism. And this is the evil that I dread.

    These are the extremes into which these violent agitations hurry

    the people, to the decrease of that middle order of men who

    shudder as much at republicanism on the one hand as they do at

    despotism on the other.[142]

 

He then taunted Ministers with abandoning Poland and not opposing the

coalition of Austria and Prussia, and asserted that the Cabinet refused

to negotiate with France because she was a Republic, and her Ministers

had not been anointed with the holy oil of Rheims. The weakest part of

the speech was that which dealt with the existing crisis. For of what

use was it to point out where Ministers had gone astray months and years

before, if he did not now mark out for them a practicable course? In

truth, though the prince of debaters, Fox lacked self-restraint, balance

of judgement, and practical sagacity. The sole important issue was the

encouraging of the peace party at Paris, with a view to the revocation

of the aggressive decrees of the Convention. In private, Fox had

admitted that they were wholly indefensible; and yet, in order to snatch

an oratorical triumph, he fired off a diatribe which could not but

stiffen the necks of the French Jacobins. At such a crisis the true

statesman merges the partisan in the patriot and says not a word to

weaken his own Government and hearten its opponents. To this height of

self-denial Fox rarely rose; and the judgement alike of his fellows and

of posterity has pronounced this speech a masterpiece of partisan

invective and of political fatuity.

 

For how was it possible to recognize the French Republic until it had

withdrawn its threats to existing Governments? Pitt had reason to

believe that a firm protest against the aggressive decrees of November

was the only means of averting an overturn of international law. He took

the proper means of protesting against them, and his protest was

disregarded. In such a case, to recognize a revolutionary Government

which had just proclaimed its sympathy with malcontents and its resolve

to dictate terms to our Dutch allies, would have been a sign of

weakness. There was but one chance of peace, namely, that Parliament

should give so overwhelming a support to Pitt and Grenville as to

convince the tyros at Paris that they had to do, not with a clique, but

a nation. This unanimity the efforts of Fox impaired. Some of his

friends voted with him from a sense of personal regard; but the greater

number passed over to the Government or did not vote. Consequently the

Foxites mustered 50 votes against 290.

 

Equally inopportune was his motion of 15th December, for sending a

Minister to Paris to treat with that Government. His knowledge of all

that went on at the French Embassy in Portman Square was so exact

(witness his repetition publicly on the 13th of the very words of one of

Lebrun's despatches to Chauvelin),[143] that he must have known of the

informal communications between Pitt and Maret, and of the arrival on

the 14th of despatches from Paris, which negatived the requests of the

Prime Minister. Doubtless it was this last circumstance which curtailed

and weakened Fox's second speech. Grey, Erskine, and Whitbread

vigorously supported the motion; but there was a general feeling that

the despatch of an ambassador to Paris would be a weak acquiescence in

the French claims. The motion was therefore negatived. Pitt was not

present at these first debates, not having yet been re-elected by the

University of Cambridge after his recent acceptance of the Lord

Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. The defence of the Government therefore

devolved chiefly upon Dundas, Windham, and Burke--a significant

conjunction of names. On 16th December Burke for the first time took his

seat on the Treasury Bench.

 

A national party might now have been formed but for the inaction of the

Duke of Portland. During the meetings at his mansion, Burlington House,

he evinced strong disapproval of the views of Fox; and, as official

leader of the Whigs, he had it in his power to bring nearly the whole of

the party over to the Government side. From this course, which would

have placed country above party, the Duke shrank; and his followers were

left to sort themselves at will. There was a general expectation that

Portland would publicly declare against Fox; but friendship or timidity

held him tongue-tied. Malmesbury sought to waken him from his "trance,"

but in vain.[144] He lay under "the wand of the magician" (Pitt's phrase

for the witchery that Fox exerted), even when so staunch a Whig as Sir

Gilbert Elliot saw that the wizard's enchantments were working infinite

mischief.[145]

 

Owing to the wrong-headedness of Fox and the timidity of Portland,

Pitt's triumph in the Commons was not decisive enough to tear the veil

away from the eyes of the French Jacobins. Nothing short of unanimity at

Westminster could have worked that miracle. Surely not even that novice

in diplomacy, Lebrun, would have threatened to appeal from the British

Government to the British nation, had he not believed the Government to

be without support.

 

This delusion appears in the memorable decree of 15th December. The

French Convention thereby asserts its resolve to revolutionize all

countries where its armies are or shall come. It will recognize no

institutions alien to the principles of Liberty, Equality, and

Fraternity. All feudal dues, customs, and privileges are to be annulled,

and the liberated people will meet in primary assemblies to organize an

Administration. Arrangements will be made for defraying the expenses of

the liberating army, and for maintaining it while it remains.[146]

Finally France declares that she will treat as an enemy the people which

refuses to accept Liberty and Equality, and tolerates its prince and

privileged castes. The decree is at once followed by a proclamation

drawn up for the benefit of the subject peoples whom it may concern.

Finally, the Convention decides that the course of rivers must

everywhere be free, and directs its generals to enforce that principle

with respect to the Scheldt.

 

In view of this stern reiteration of the right to overturn all

Governments that conflict with revolutionary principles, it is

impossible to consider the decree of 19th November, offering assistance

to malcontent peoples, as a meaningless display of emotion. Subsequent

events threw a sinister light on it. The annexation of Savoy on 27th

November was not a convincing proof of altruism; and the refusal of the

Executive Council, on 8th and 9th December, to reconsider its decision

on the Scheldt, marked a firm resolve to carry out French policy in the

Pays Bas, even if it led to war with England. Now there came, as a

damning corollary, the decree of 15th December, which flung defiance at

all Governments of the old type. Like Mohammed, Lebrun stood forth with

the "Contrat Social" in one hand, the sword in the other, and bade the

world take its choice.

 

For England there could be no doubt. Pitt and Grenville had decided that

the only chance of peace lay in offering a firm front to every act of

aggression. In this they had general support. Fox might choose to

distort facts by declaring that Ministers were about to plunge the

country into war on a matter of form[147] (the refusal to treat

officially with the French Republic); but everyone knew that the first

aggressive action was that of France, directed against the Anglo-Dutch

alliance. The firmness of Ministers gained them support in unexpected

quarters. On 20th December, when they asked for a vote for 25,000

seamen, including 5,000 marines, Sheridan heartily declared that he

would have supported a vote for 40,000 seamen if that number had been

deemed necessary. He also made a suggestion that the British Parliament

or people should appeal to the generous instincts of Frenchmen to spare

the life of Louis XVI. The proposal came somewhat oddly in a debate for

increasing our forces against France; and it brought up Burke in one of

his most acrid moods. Such an appeal, he said, was futile, for Louis was

in the custody of assassins who were both accusers and judges: his death

was inevitable. Sheridan and Fox heartily reprobated this recklessly

vindictive language.

 

Pitt then pointed out that on 17th August George III had expressed an

earnest desire for the safety of Louis and the Royal Family of France in

terms which were then read out. The same was the desire of every Briton;

and the sentiments now expressed in that House would be heard and noted

at Paris. If any more formal measure were to be adopted, he suggested

the entering a protest in the Journals of the House; but any public

representation, he said, must be couched in terms of indignation which

must tend to defeat its own object. With this method of procedure Fox

and Sheridan expressed their entire concurrence.[148] It is therefore a

malicious falsehood to say that Pitt opposed their suggestion.[149]

Burke certainly did so, and in the worst possible taste; but Pitt

carried it out so far as was deemed desirable. If Sheridan and Fox

wished for a public appeal, it was for them to set it on foot.

 

I must here notice the vague and misleading statements in Godoy's

Memoirs (written a generation later) that Spain made strenuous efforts

to save the life of Louis XVI and opened "an unlimited credit" at Paris

with the view of bribing members of the Convention to secure his

acquittal. Further, that he, Godoy, secretly approached Pitt in order to

secure his financial aid, which that statesman obstinately refused.[150]

The story does not hang well together; for if Spain had already opened

an unlimited credit at Paris, why did she want pecuniary help from Pitt?

Further, the opening of unlimited credit, presumably with a Parisian

bank, did not consort well with the secret methods which were essential

to the success of the plan.

 

In order to probe this matter to the bottom, I have examined the British

Foreign Office archives relating to Spain for the months of December and

January. They are detailed and apparently complete. F. J. Jackson, our

_chargé d'affaires_ at Madrid, wrote to Lord Grenville every three or

four days, as the relations of the two States had been far from cordial

owing to friction caused by the cession of Nootka Sound, Captain

Vancouver having been employed to settle the boundaries and fix a

neutral zone between the two Empires. Grenville also wrote three times

to Jackson to express his apprehension that the timidity and poverty of

Spain would cause her to yield to the French Republic in the matter of

some demonstrations on the frontier. But there is no word implying that

Spain requested help from England, either pecuniary or diplomatic, in

order to save Louis. Early in January Charles IV made such an appeal to

the French Convention, but it was treated with contemptuous

indifference. At that time the Courts of London and Madrid were

beginning to draw closer together in order to withstand the demands of

France; but nothing passed between them officially