William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

less provoking terms than the last. He sought an informal

interview with Grenville, which was immediately granted. Grenville's

hitherto unpublished account of the interview may be quoted in full, as

it enables us to see the _nuances_ of the situation:

 

                                            _Jan. 13, 1793._[170]

 

Chauvelin as soon as he came into my room began by stating

    that he was desirous of explaining that all his steps subsequent

    to the date of my letter of Dec. 31 had been taken in

    consequence of positive instructions from the _Conseil

    Exécutif_, given before they had received that letter. That they

    had seen in that letter one thing which had been satisfactory to

    them, notwithstanding the other things of which they might

    complain--this was the assurance which enabled them to reject

    the idea entertained by some persons in France of its being the

    intention of the Government here to declare war at all events.

    Under this assurance they had authorized him to give to their

    answer a form which was not liable to the exceptions which had

    before been taken. He then gave me the despatch from M. Le Brun.

    When I had read it I told him only that the circumstances were

    too critical for me to say anything as to its contents except to

    refer him to the answer which I should be [_sic_] to give to it.

 

    He then said that there was one other point which he was

    desirous of mentioning. That one of the difficulties of the

    present situation of the two Countries was the want of a proper

    channel of communication. That he himself, from having no access

    to the King's Ministers, was frequently unable to give accounts

    of their real views and intentions. That he was therefore to

    desire the permission to see me often _sous la même forme_ that

    he had now come [_sic_].

 

    I told him that this was a point on which I was unwilling to

    take upon myself personally to give him an answer; but that he

    should have one; and in order to avoid mistakes I repeated to

    him the phrase, that his request was to see me _sous la même

    forme_. He said "yes," and that this was conceived to be a means

    of arriving sooner at the object of his being allowed to

    present to the King the _lettres de créance_ with which he was

    charged. As he did not express this quite distinctly, I asked

    him again whether I understood him right; that his present

    request was only to communicate under the form in which he now

    came. He again assented to this, but in doing it threw out that

    he had _almost_ had direct orders from the _Conseil Exécutif_ to

    apply for permission to present his letters. He however

    expressly assented to my statement that the other was at present

    his only request.

 

    Nothing else material passed, except justifications of himself

    from the imputation of treating on public business with some

    persons in this country with whom he had connections of private

    friendship and intercourse, and complaints of the manner in

    which he was treated in the newspapers. To neither of these

    points I said anything.[171]

 

It is not surprising that Grenville asked for time to consult his

colleagues (probably also the King) before returning an answer to

Lebrun's missive; for, though unobjectionable in form, it re-affirmed

the French claims and justified all the proceedings of that Government.

Lebrun accused the Pitt Cabinet of raising difficulties of form and of

discovering hostile intentions where none existed. While repudiating the

notion of annexing Belgium, he firmly adhered to the Scheldt decree.

France, he declared, would respond to all appeals which emanated from

the general will of a nation, and he even asserted that she could treat

only with a Government which "is deemed the organ of the general will of

the nation governed." If her efforts for peace failed, she would fight

England with regret but without fear.[172]

 

In effect, then, this despatch held out no hope of a reconciliation.

There came with it, however, a long and rambling letter from Maret to

Miles, which was intended partly to threaten, partly to cajole the

Ministry. In its more dulcet passages the hope was set forth that the

Scheldt affair could be settled, and even that Chauvelin might be

replaced by the estimable Barthélemy. Miles, highly elated, hurried to

the Foreign Office on that momentous Sunday, 13th January, and found

that a Cabinet meeting was proceeding. Pitt came out and cordially

received Maret's note. He returned to the Cabinet meeting (at which,

strange to say, Burke was present) but came out again "furious,

freighted with the bile of the whole Cabinet," and forbade Miles to have

any dealings with the French Executive Council.[173]

 

How are we to explain this change from affability to anger? The

impressionable Miles believed that in that hour Pitt capitulated to

Burke and became a man of war. The reader who takes the trouble to

compare Lebrun's note with that of Maret will probably come to another

conclusion, namely, that the latter seems very like a device to throw

the British Ministry off its guard. The terms of the two notes are

widely divergent; and, in such a case, Pitt naturally accepted that of

Lebrun and scouted that of Maret, as of a busybody or an intriguer.

Grenville objected to this double-dealing;[174] and probably the

presence of Burke at the Cabinet meeting sharpened the demand for its

cessation.

 

Another explanation of Pitt's fury is possible. Grenville and he may

have received news of the warlike preparations going on in the French

seaports and on the Dutch borders. I have found no proof of this; but it

is certain that by this time they must have had before them the

inflammatory appeal of Monge to French and English Jacobins as well as

the boastful tirade of Kersaint to the Convention. Having these proofs

of the warlike ardour of the French and of their reliance on British

reformers, how could Pitt and Grenville look on the philanthropic

professions of Maret as anything but a snare, and Miles as his dupe?

Miles had ever been officious. Clearly the time had come to stop his

fussy advances to an unofficial agent, which Lebrun might once more

ascribe to Pitt's secret fear of France.

 

It would be interesting to discover how far Pitt and Grenville were at

this time aware of the secret designs of the French Executive Council.

On this topic I have found no definite evidence. It is very unlikely

that on 13th January they knew of the aggressive plans which the

Executive Council had formed three days before. But it is certain that

such plans were set on foot on 10th January. On that day the Executive

Council drew up secret orders for Generals Dumouriez and Miranda. The

former was then at Paris concerting plans for the next campaign, not

for the purpose of saving Louis XVI, as he afterwards stated. Whether he

fanned the warlike ardour of the Executive Council will perhaps never be

known. But undoubtedly on 10th January the Executive Council bade him

order his lieutenant, Miranda, to prepare for the invasion of Dutch

Flanders and Walcheren within twelve days. Furnaces were to be supplied

to the French gun-vessels in the Scheldt so as to beat off the frigates,

whether English or Dutch is not stated.[175]

 

Why did not Miranda carry out this plan? Merely because he had neither

stores nor food[176]--a fact which justifies the British Government in

placing an embargo on the corn intended for France. Undoubtedly if he

had had supplies, Miranda would have seized the lands at the mouth of

the Scheldt, and cut off the retreat of the Stadholder to his place of

refuge, Walcheren. It will further be observed that these orders were

given at Paris three days after the despatch of Lebrun's and Maret's

notes to London. The design apparently was to amuse England until a

deadly blow could be struck at the Dutch. Auckland, writing on the 11th

at The Hague, expressed to Grenville the hope that war might be avoided,

or, if that were impossible, that the rupture should be postponed until

the Austrians and Prussians had re-crossed the Rhine. The preparations

of the Dutch were going on with the usual slowness.[177] Evidently the

French Government counted on their traditional inertia and on the

malcontents in Great Britain and Ireland. The private letters of Maret,

that _soi-disant_ friend of peace, breathe full assurance of

victory.[178]

 

Grenville of course sent no answer to the last missive of Maret; but to

Lebrun he replied, on 18th January, that his explanations were wholly

unsatisfactory, as they maintained the right of the Executive Council to

annul treaties at will. Until satisfaction were granted for the

aggressions on His Majesty's ally, he would continue to take all

measures needful for their common safety. The terms of this reply were

doubtless due to the last news received from Paris. On 12th January the

arch-intriguer, Brissot, had fired off at the Convention a warlike

harangue in which he depicted the British Ministry as helpless in the

midst of a discontented populace and without a friend in the world.

France could therefore easily arouse Ireland and Scotland to revolt,

besides carrying liberty to India.[179] On the following day the

Convention ordered the equipment of 30 sail-of-the-line and 20 frigates,

and the construction of 25 sail-of-the-line and 20 frigates.

 

On his side Chauvelin saw the rupture to be imminent. In forwarding

Grenville's despatch to Lebrun on the 19th he described his situation in

London as intolerable, and added that no alternative but war was left.

His assistant, Reinhard, ended a letter of that day to Miles with the

words "_M. Chauvelin leaves_." That resolve must have been strengthened

by Grenville's haughty note of the 20th, stating that no special means

could be taken to protect his couriers and that he must rank "among the

general mass of foreigners resident in England." On the same day

Grenville informed Sir James Murray, who had gone on a special mission

to the Prussian headquarters, that war was likely to break out, as

France "insists on terms entirely inconsistent with the Government of

this country and His Majesty's dignity and honour." His Majesty is

strenuously making preparations and hopes to concert plans with Prussia

and Austria.[180]

 

Such was the state of affairs on 21st January, when Louis XVI laid his

head on the block in the Place de la Révolution. The news of this

tragedy reached London late in the afternoon of the 23rd; and the horror

which it aroused led to a demand at the Haymarket that the farce should

be put off. On the advice of the Cabinet George III now intervened. At a

Court held on the morrow at the Queen's House (on the site of Buckingham

Palace) an order was issued that Chauvelin, as the envoy deputed by

Louis XVI, should leave the country on or before 1st February. But on or

before 25th January, that is, before the news of this mandate can have

reached Paris, Lebrun had decided to recall the French mission from

London. On 25th January he wrote to Monsieur Greenville [_sic_] stating

that, as his plenipotentiary, Chauvelin, had orders to return to Paris,

Maret would proceed to London to look after the papers at the French

Embassy. This statement merits attention; for it shows that Chauvelin's

departure was hastened only a day or two by the King's command;[181]

and further it refutes the oft-repeated assertion that Maret came

charged with offers of peace to which Pitt and Grenville paid no heed.

 

It will be well to examine this latter question somewhat closely. In

order to understand the situation at Paris, we must remember that

Dumouriez was at that time hesitating between an attack on Holland and a

pacific mission to England. On 23rd January, while at Paris, he wrote

two very significant letters, one to Miranda, the other to Auckland. In

the former he states: "The Executive Council ... has thought of sending

me as special ambassador to England to make that country decide

definitely for peace or war. Consequently _an order has been given for

our ambassador, Chauvelin, to return_. To-morrow they will send a secret

agent [Maret], very well known to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, to ask the two

parties (that is to say the whole nation) for a safe-conduct for me and

an assurance that I shall be welcome. As I have to ask for _yes_ or

_no_, like Cato at Carthage, this mission will not last more than eight

days." Pending the reply to the first question (says Dumouriez) he will

set out for Dunkirk, Bruges, and Antwerp. His second letter, of the same

date, is to Auckland at The Hague, stating that he knows him to be

desirous of peace, as he himself is. Can