William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

usually open to the soothing influences of

flattery. Grenville, however, drove him to open enmity, which finally

wreaked its revenge;[193] for it was Chauvelin's report on the readiness

of Britons to revolt which finally decided the Convention to declare war

on 1st February. We may also inquire why the Court of St. James's did

not make clear the course of conduct which it proposed to take in the

future respecting France.[194] As outlined in the despatch of 29th

December to Whitworth, it formed the basis of a practicable compromise.

If it could be stated confidentially to Russia, Austria, and Prussia,

why not to France? Probably the objections of George III to the faintest

sign of recognition of the French Republic[195] account for the fact

that these enlightened intentions remained, down to the year 1800,

secret except to those Powers. But statesmen err when they bury their

good intentions in the secrecy of archives and allow public opinion to

sympathize with the enemy. Here was Pitt's most serious blunder. At the

outset of the struggle, and throughout its course, he scorned those

tactful arts and melodramatic ways which win over waverers and inspire

the fainthearted. Here he showed himself not a son of Chatham, but a

Grenville. The results of this frigidity were disastrous. All Frenchmen

and many Britons believed that he went out of his way to assail a

peaceful Republic in order to crush liberty abroad and at home. History

has exposed the falseness of the slander; but a statesman ought not to

owe his vindication to research in archives. He needs whole-hearted

support in the present more than justification by students.

 

In this respect Pitt showed less of worldly wisdom than the journalists

and barristers who leaped to power at Paris. Their chief source of

strength lay in skilful appeals to popular passion. In reality their

case was untenable before any calm and judicial tribunal. But the France

of that age was anything but calm and judicial. It lived on enthusiasm

and sensation; and the Girondins and Jacobins fed it almost to

repletion. Unfortunately Danton, the only man who combined strength with

some insight into statecraft, was away in Belgium while the crisis

developed; and the conduct of affairs rested mainly with Lebrun and his

envoy Chauvelin. It is only fair to remember that they were thirty and

twenty-seven years of age respectively, and had had just four months and

eight months of official experience. In such a case pity must blend with

censure. The frightful loss of experienced men and the giddy preference

for new-comers were among the most fatal characteristics of the

revolutionary movement. Needing natures that were able, yet

self-restrained, bold, but cautiously bold, it now found as leaders

calculating fanatics like Robespierre, headstrong orators and

wire-pullers like the Girondin leaders, or lucky journalists like

Lebrun. To play to the gallery was his first instinct; and the tottering

fortunes of the Gironde made it almost a necessity. Hence his refusal

and that of his colleagues to draw back a hair's breadth from the

unjustifiable position which they had taken up. Behind them loomed the

September massacres, fatal to two Foreign Ministers of France; before

them shone the splendours of a liberating crusade. We can scarcely blame

men so ardent, so hard pressed.

 

But there are some rules of the game which even the most irresponsible

of Ministers must observe. Here both Chauvelin and Lebrun went fatally

astray. Chauvelin's _pique_ at the interview which Pitt had with Maret

on 2nd December led him flagrantly to misrepresent that incident, and

Lebrun, as we have seen, reported it to the Convention in such a way as

to impute to Pitt a discreditable and cowardly intrigue. This is the

climax of malice. An envoy and a Minister who scatter such insinuations

are the most reckless of firebrands. By this conduct both Lebrun and

Chauvelin inflamed the passions of their countrymen. In truth, it was

passion, not policy, that made the war. The charges which they brought

against England were of secondary importance--her demand for the

revocation of the decrees concerning the Scheldt and the encouragement

offered to malcontents, together with her stoppage of corn ships lading

for France, and her Aliens Bill. Such were the pretexts for the recall

of Chauvelin, which, as we have seen, was decided at Paris before the

Court of St. James's determined to dismiss him.

 

Another fact comes out clearly from a survey of the evidence given

above, namely, that the execution of Louis XVI was in no sense the cause

of the war. The question turned essentially on the conduct of France

towards our Dutch Allies. Before Louis was put on his trial Pitt and

Grenville had decided that the French must retract their aggressive

decree against Holland, backed up as it was by a claim to support

malcontents in any land. Failing this, war would have ensued, even if

Louis had not been condemned to death. The tragedy of 21st January made

no difference to the issue; for, as we have seen, the French Government

by 10th January decided to push on its plans against the Dutch Republic.

It is also impossible to attach any importance to the vague offers of

Dumouriez and Maret, at which Lebrun connived probably so as to be able

to say, without committing himself in the least, that he had done all he

could for peace.

 

We may therefore conclude that the wealth and defencelessness of the

Dutch Netherlands lured on the enthusiasts and intriguers of Paris to an

enterprise the terrible results of which were unsuspected by them.

Nothing is more remarkable than the full assurance of victory which

breathes in the letters of Dumouriez, the despatches of Lebrun, and the

speeches of the French deputies. Experienced statesmen were soon to

stand aghast at the triumph of the Republican arms; but it fell short of

the hopes of the French politicians. In this boundless self-confidence,

sublime were it not so disastrous, is to be found the chief cause of war

in 1793.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[138] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 385-7.

 

[139] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.

 

[140] Pitt MSS., 245. Published in "Napoleon and the Invasion of

England," by H. E. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, ii, App.

 

[141] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 475.

 

[142] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 19-21.

 

[143] Miles ("Corresp.," i, 391), who also asserts that Sheridan echoed

words used by the French agent, Noël.

 

[144] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 478-81.

 

[145] "Life and Letters of Earl Minto," ii, 82.

 

[146] Chuquet, "Jemappes," 196-7, shows that the urgent needs of the

army in Belgium were the _raison d'être_ of the decree.

 

[147] "Dropmore P.," ii, 359-62; "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 126.

 

[148] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 137-46.

 

[149] "Méms. tirés des Papiers d'un homme d'Etat," ii, 100. This false

assertion was adopted by Malouet ("Méms.," ii, 201), whence it has been

copied largely, without examination of the debate itself.

 

[150] Godoy, "Mems.," i, ch. vi.

 

[151] "F. O.," Spain, 25, 26.

 

[152] "F. O.," France, 40.

 

[153] "F. O.," France, 40, 41.

 

[154] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 398-400. Unfortunately, Lord Acton ("Lects.

on the French Rev.," 253) accepted the stories against Pitt. He states

that Danton secretly offered to save Louis for £40,000; that Lansdowne,

Sheridan, and Fox urged Pitt to interpose; and that Pitt informed Maret

that he did not do so because the execution of Louis would ruin the

Whigs. I must reply that Lord Fitzmaurice assures me there is no sign

that the first Lord Lansdowne urged Pitt to bribe the Convention, though

in the debate of 21st December 1792 he suggested the sending an

ambassador to Paris to improve the relations of the two lands, and

assuage the hostility to Louis. Further, Danton could scarcely have made

that offer; for he left Paris for Belgium on 1st December, and did not

return till 14th January, after which he was engrossed in the last

illness of his wife. Danton's name was dragged into the affair probably

by mistake for Dannon (see Belloc, "Danton," 200). Lastly, as Maret left

London on 19th December, and did not return until 30th January, he did

not see Pitt at the crucial time of the trial. And would Pitt have made

so damaging a remark to a Frenchman? Is it not obviously a Whig slander?

 

[155] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 189. See ch. iii of this work.

 

[156] See ch. iii for a refutation of this.

 

[157] Sorel, iii, 241. So, too, Gouverneur Morris, then in Paris,

thought the French Ministers, despite their bluster, wished to avoid war

"if the people will let them." (Quoted by Lecky, vi, 114.)

 

[158] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 250-3; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 114-16.

 

[159] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.

 

[160] _Ibid._, and "Dropmore P.," ii, 361.

 

[161] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 253-6; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 116-9.

 

[162] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 351.

 

[163] "Dropmore P.," ii, 363.

 

[164] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.

 

[165] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to Whitworth, 29th December.

 

[166] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 441.

 

[167] _Ibid._, i, 439.

 

[168] I published it in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1906; see, too,

Fitzmaurice, "Shelburne," iii, 515. Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters"

(Talleyrand), wrongly states that he was at once expelled.

 

[169] "Ann. Reg.," 122-5; "Parl Hist.," xxx, 259-61; Miles, "Corresp.,"

ii, 4.

 

[170] "F. O.," France, 41.

 

[171] Whether Chauvelin was guilty of any worse offence than

entertaining at his house the editors of Opposition newspapers (Miles,

"Corresp.," i, 440) is not proven. Maret admitted to Miles that some

scoundrels were sowing sedition in England; but he added the not very

comforting assurance that, in that case, they would cease to be

Frenchmen. Miles evidently believed those intrigues to be the work of

French emissaries, (_Ibid._, 450, 451).

 

[172] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 262-6; "Ann. Reg.," 119-22.

 

[173] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 28-36, 42. See, too, Sorel, iii, 258, on

Maret's letter.

 

[174] "Dropmore P.," ii, 366; but see Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 43, 44.

 

[175] "Corresp. du Gén. Miranda avec le Gén. Dumouriez ... depuis

janvier 1793," 3-8. See "Dropmore P.," ii, 371, on Dumouriez' plan.

 

[176] _Ibid._, 8.

 

[177] "Dropmore P.," ii, 365.

 

[178] Miles, ii, 36.

 

[179] "Gower's Despatches," 278.

 

[180] B.M. Add. MSS., 34447.

 

[181] "F. O.," France, 41. The order to Chauvelin must have been given

earlier, probably on 22nd January, as will be seen by Dumouriez' letter

to Miranda soon to be quoted. George III's order of 24th January

(endorsed by Pitt) for Chauvelin's expulsion cannot have the importance

which Mr. J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," 262-3) assigns to it. See "Pitt

and Napoleon Miscellanies" for Lebrun's letter to Grenville.

 

[182] Published in "Dumouriez, etc.," 159, 160, by J. H. Rose and A. M.

Broadley, from B.M. Add. MSS., 34447.

 

[183] Lecky, vi, 119-22.

 

[184] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 55.

 

[185] Miles, "Conduct of France towards Great Britain," 108; "Corresp.,"

ii, 62.

 

[186] Miles, "Conduct of France towards Great Britain," 108.

 

[187] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 62.

 

[188] Dumouriez, "Méms.," ii, 128-31 (edit. of 1794).

 

[189] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 350. Fox admitted (p. 371) that Maret did not

think himself authorized to negotiate. See, too, Bland Burges in

"Auckland Journals," ii, 493. I cannot agree with Mr. Oscar Browning

("Varennes, etc.," 198), and Mr. J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," 258) as to

the importance of Maret's "mission." Lecky (vi, 126) also overrates it,

in my judgement.

 

[190] "Dropmore P.," ii, 322.

 

[191] "Auckland Journals," ii, 465.

 

[192] "Moniteur," 29th November 1792.

 

[193] Maret stated that "M. Chauvelin had shamefully deceived the

Executive Council, and that nothing but misrepresentations and

falsehoods had marked his despatches since he lost all hope of remaining

in this country" (Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 62).

 

[194] Wilberforce urged this ("Life," ii, 13).

 

[195] "Dropmore P.," ii, 339, 351, 378.

 

CHAPTER V (THE FLEMISH CAMPAIGN (1793))