William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (e book reader for pc .TXT) 📖

they not have an interview on

the Dutch frontier, near Antwerp, where he will be on 30th January?[182]

 

Now it is clear from Grenville's and Auckland's correspondence that

Ministers paid some heed to the offer of Dumouriez. Nothing came of it

owing to the arrival of news of the French declaration of war; but the

proposal was at least considered.[183] There is not a line to show that

Pitt and Grenville took Maret's so-called "mission" at all seriously.

For, in the first place, he had no powers, no authority to do anything

more than collect the papers of the embassy. He himself gave out to

Miles that he came on a "pacific mission," but he carefully refrained

from telling even him what it was.[184] His biographer, Ernouf, has

invested his journey to London with some importance by declaring that on

22nd January he (Maret) drew up and sent off a "despatch" to Chauvelin,

stating that the French Executive Council desired peace, and that he was

coming as _chargé d'affaires_ to the French Embassy in London. This

missive (whether signed by Lebrun is not stated) met Chauvelin on his

way from London to Dover; but it produced no change whatever in his

plans. He proceeded on his way to Paris, passing Maret in the night near

Abbeville. To assign much importance to his "despatch" is to overrate

both his errand and his position at Paris. Maret was only one of the

head clerks at the French Foreign Office and had no right to sign

official despatches. If he really was charged by Lebrun to tender the

olive-branch, why was not that despatch sent to London in a form and

manner which would procure credence and have some effect? Again, if

Maret came to restore peace, why did he not at once produce his powers?

The question was infinitely important and undeniably urgent. Instead of

taking decisive action, as any well-wisher of mankind must have done at

so awful a crisis, he declined to enter into particulars, and, on the

plea that Chauvelin was ordered to Paris (which he himself knew before

he left that city) waited for further instructions--which never came.

Finally he confessed to Miles that he came to prepare the way for

Dumouriez and to discover whether that general would be assured of

personal safety if he came to England.

 

    Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.

 

Such must have been the thought of Miles, when he heard this singular

admission. For what trust could be placed in Dumouriez, whose conquest

of Belgium--the source of the present difficulties--had by no means

sated his desire for its natural sequel, the conquest of Holland? That

Maret had credentials of some kind may be admitted; for he showed them

to Miles and claimed to be _chargé d'affaires_; but, as Miles found his

powers to be "extremely limited,"[185] we may doubt whether they

extended beyond the collection and transport of the archives of Portman

Square. If he had any authority to treat with our Government, it is

curious that he refrained from doing so merely on the ground of

Chauvelin's departure. "Apprehensive that this event might derange what

had been agreed upon, he despatched a messenger with a letter to Lebrun

stating that _under the present circumstances, he should not think

himself authorized to communicate with the British Ministers without

fresh instructions_."[186]

 

Notwithstanding the urgency of the case, he received not a line, not

even a newspaper, from Paris during his stay in London. In fact, the

_soi-disant "chargé d'affaires"_ of France knew so little of the real

state of affairs that he assured Miles of the desire of his countrymen

to give up Nice, Mainz, Worms, the Rhineland, the Scheldt, and the Low

Countries[187]--at the very time (31st January) when Danton carried

unanimously a decree annexing the Low Countries to the French Republic.

 

The explanation of the silence of Maret and the ambiguous conduct of

Dumouriez may be found in the Memoirs of the latter. He states that a

proposal came up in the French Executive Council at Paris on 22nd

January to send him to London; but it was negatived by three votes to

two. Nevertheless, he arranged with the minority (Lebrun and Garat) that

he should go to Antwerp and have _pourparlers_ with Auckland preparatory

to a mission to England, while Maret returned to London to pave the way

for him.[188] The scheme was a private venture, proposed by Dumouriez,

and favoured only by the minority of the Council. In such a case neither

Dumouriez nor Maret could be invested with official functions; and it

was only a last despairing effort for peace that led Maret to pose as a

_chargé d'affaires_ and write to Paris for "fresh instructions." This

praiseworthy device did not altogether impose even on Miles, who clearly

was puzzled by the air of mystery that his friend assumed.

 

In view of the facts now set forth, can we blame Pitt and Grenville for

declining to treat with Maret? He brought with him no proof that he had

any other function than that of taking over the archives of the French

embassy. Grenville stated to Auckland that Maret's presence caused much

dabbling in the funds, and that his presence was most undesirable if

Dumouriez really intended to treat for peace. Pitt afterwards assured

the House of Commons that Maret had not made the smallest communication

to Ministers.[189] Evidently they looked on him as an unofficial

emissary, to which level Chauvelin had persistently endeavoured to

degrade him.

 

Finally, on 4th February, Grenville ordered Maret to leave the country.

By this time news had arrived from Paris that France had laid an embargo

on British ships in her ports; and this portended more serious news. By

that time the die was cast. On 31st January Danton carried the

Convention with him in a fiery speech, crowned with that gigantic

phrase--"Let us fling down to the Kings the head of a King as gage of

battle"; then, in defiance of the well-known facts of the case, he urged

the deputies to decree an act of political union with the Belgians, who

were already one at heart with them. On the following day the Convention

confirmed this aggressive action by unanimously decreeing war against

Great Britain and Holland. By so doing the deputies of France merely

endorsed the decision formed by the Executive Council on 10th January.

 

                  *       *       *       *       *

 

The outbreak of war between France and England is an event so fraught

with momentous issues to Pitt, to the two Powers, and to the whole

world, that I have striven to set forth as fully as possible every

incident, every misunderstanding, every collision of interests or

feelings, that brought it to pass. No episode in the development of the

nations of Europe is so tragic as this. That two peoples should, within

the space of nine months, abjure their friendly relations and furiously

grapple in a life and death struggle over questions of secondary

importance leads the dazed beholder at first to grope after the old

Greek idea of +atê+ or Nemesis. In reality the case does not call for

supernatural agency. The story is pitiably human, if the student will

but master its complex details. It may be well to close our study with a

few general observations, though they almost necessarily involve the

risk of over-statement.

 

Firstly, the position of absolute neutrality which Pitt took up from the

beginning of the troubles in France was extremely difficult to maintain

amidst the rising passions of the year 1792. The Franco-Austrian war

soon led to a situation in which the future conduct of the neutral

aroused far more suspicion, and scarcely less hatred, than that of the

enemy himself. When brains reeled with rage against tyrants; when cheeks

flushed at the thought of the woes of Marie Antoinette, correct

neutrality seemed inhuman. In an age that vibrated to the appeals of

Madame Roland and Burke, cold passivity aroused doubt or contempt. Yet

it is certain that Pitt and Grenville clung to that position, even when

its difficulties increased tenfold with the fall of the monarchy and the

September massacres. Lebrun, on coming into office after the former of

those events, was careful to inform his countrymen that the withdrawal

of the British ambassador was not an unfriendly act, and that England

was making no preparations for war. Later on he chose to represent

Pitt's conduct as persistently unfriendly; but his earlier words prove

the contrary.

 

Again, was it practicable (as Fox claimed) for Pitt to forbid Austria

and Prussia to coalesce against France? Probably it was not possible,

without bringing Russia and Sweden into the field on the royalist side.

In the excited state of men's minds, an act so annoying as that of armed

mediation would have widened the circle of war; and, as we have seen, it

was the belief of Pitt and Grenville, in August-September 1792, that the

continental war might probably end from the inability of the combatants

to continue it. No one at that time foresaw the easy conquest of Savoy

and the Low Countries by the French troops. In one of the few references

to foreign affairs in Pitt's letters of the month following, we find him

stating that if France conquers and keeps Savoy, a new situation will

arise.[190] But he remained passive while the French drove the Sardinian

troops from Savoy; and his whole conduct at this time moved Burke to

indignation, if not despair. So late as 6th November Grenville expressed

to Auckland his firm belief in the policy of strict neutrality.[191]

 

What was it, then, that blighted these hopes? The answer must be that

the French victory of Jemappes (6th November) and the phenomenally easy

conquest of the Austrian Netherlands speedily brought about a new and

most threatening situation. It has been usual to say, with Goethe, that

Valmy was the birth of a new age. Far more truly may we say so of

Jemappes and its immediate results. That decisive triumph and the

welcome accorded by the liberated Belgians opened up vistas of

beneficent triumph that set the brain of France in a whirl. Hence the

decrees of 16th November-15th December, which tear to pieces the old

diplomacy, and apply to astonished Europe the gospel of Rousseau. In

place of musty treaties there will be Social Contracts; instead of

States there will be nations that will speak straight to one another's

heart. They do speak: English Radical Clubs speak to the heart of

France, the Convention; and Grégoire, President of that body, makes

answer that if the rulers of England threaten the delegates and their

comrades, Frenchmen will cross the Straits and fly to their help--"Come,

generous Britons," he cries, "let us all confederate for the welfare of

Humanity."[192] In the new age, then, political life will be a series of

_tableaux_ from the gospel of Rousseau. To the true believer there can

be no compromise. Relics of old-world customs, such as the closing of

the Scheldt by the Dutch, must vanish. Here, as elsewhere, Nature will

infallibly guide men aright.

 

It was the application of these principles to our ally, the Dutch

Republic, which Pitt refused to accept, especially as their corollary

made for the aggrandisement of France. In his eyes international law

imposed stringent obligations, which no one State, or nation, had the

right to revoke. Old world theories of life, when rudely assailed at

Paris, moved their champions to an enthusiasm scarcely less keen than

that of the Jacobins. Britons who fraternized with the new hierophants

were counted traitors to their King. Moreover, by a most unfortunate

coincidence, the British Government publicly announced its resolve to

support the Dutch Republic on the very day when the French Convention

passed the first of its subversive decrees. Thus, national pride came

sharply into conflict. Neither side could give way without seeming to

betray alike its principles and its honour.

 

Personal questions played a baneful part in embittering the feud. Pitt

and Grenville shrouded themselves in their insular and innate austerity.

They judged the English Radical clubs too harshly; they ascribed to

those who congratulated the Convention on 28th November treasonable

aims which can scarcely have arisen in England when the addresses were

drawn up. Apart from frothy republican talk, which should have been

treated with quiet contempt, those congratulations contained no sign of

consciousness that France was about to challenge us to conflict. We may

admit that Frost and Barlow showed great tactlessness in presenting

those addresses when friction between the two nations had already begun;

for the incident, besides stiffening the necks of Frenchmen, gave the

Reform movement an appearance of disloyalty to England which worked

infinite harm. Nevertheless, on reviewing these questions, we see that

Pitt treated the foolish ebullitions of youth as though they implied

malice.

 

Surely, too, he, and still more Grenville, were unwise in placing

Chauvelin under a political and social ban, which naturally led him to

consort with the bitterest enemies of Government in order to annoy

Ministers here and please his employers at Paris. A touchy and sensitive

nature like Chauvelin's is